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δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης 
You may not step twice into the same river.1 
* * * 
The powers delegated . . . to the federal government are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are 
numerous and indefinite.2 
* * * 
There shall be no private ownership of the streams that come out of 
the canyons, nor the timber that grows on the hills. These belong to 
the people: all the people.3 
* * * 
Unless we use our water more sustainably and manage it more 
inclusively, we may indeed see more water-related conflict within 
countries than between them.4 
  
 
1 Heraclitus as quoted in PLATO, PLATO VI: CRATYLUS. PARMENIDES. GREATER 
HIPPIAS. LESSER HIPPIAS. 66–67 (E. Capps, T.E. Page & W.H.D. Rouse eds., H.N. Fowler 
trans., 1926) (translation altered). 
2 James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, at 237–38 (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
3 ROBERT GOTTLIEB, A LIFE OF ITS OWN: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF WATER 204 
(1988) (quoting Brigham Young) (emphasis added). 
4 Scott Moore, Letters to the Editor, ECONOMIST (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www. 
economist.com/letters/2019/03/21/letters-to-the-editor [https://perma.cc/Q8BX-9C2M]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n 1990, Robert Bork wrote that federalism “is usually thought 
passé, quaint, or even tyrannical.”5 Yet, in the intervening three 
decades, federalism, under the banner of “States’ rights,” far from 
being passé or quaint, seems to be enjoying a renaissance, on both the 
right and the left of the ideological spectrum.6 In a widely popular and 
increasingly influential book,7 Jeffrey Sutton—looking to state 
constitutions as an alternative source of remedies to the United States 
Constitution for violations of fundamental human rights8—gives new 
meaning to states’ rights, and thus to federalism. Rather than “[a] single 
laboratory of experimentation for fifty-one jurisdictions,” Sutton 
argues, allowing the state courts to experiment with remedies under 
their own constitutions would have the benefit of giving the United 
States Supreme Court time to learn from those experiments before 
pronouncing a solution or remedy for the entire nation.9 For Sutton, 
[t]he more difficult the constitutional question . . . the more 
indeterminate the answer may be. In these settings, it may be more 
appropriate to tolerate fifty-one imperfect solutions rather than to 
impose one imperfect solution on the country as a whole, particularly 
when imperfection may be something we have to live with in a given 
area.10 
 
5 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 52 (1990). 
6 See Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s 
Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State 
Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2019). 
7 JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018). Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, for instance, 
referred to 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS during his Senate Confirmation Hearing. Supreme 
Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1, C-SPAN (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?449705-1/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-
confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-1&start=1480 [https://perma.cc/9VGD-4H5T]. 
8 Recent and topical examples of this can be found in both the United States Supreme 
Court and in state supreme court decisions. Of the former, see Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. 
Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (Mem) (2018) (remanding the case to the Washington Supreme 
Court for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)); Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 139 
S. Ct. 2713 (Mem) (2019) (remanding the case to the Oregon Court of Appeals for further 
consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018)). Of the latter, see the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hodes & 
Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019) (upholding the right to an abortion 
in the Kansas Constitution); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) 
(rejecting a claim for a violation of the Washington Constitution’s free exercise clause). 
9 SUTTON, supra note 7, at 216. 
10 Id. at 19. 
I 
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While federalism may no longer be quaint or passé, is it still 
tyrannical? Bork argued that it once was because, quite apart from 
providing remedies for civil rights violations, it allowed southern states 
to legislate for racial inequality.11 Much of the taint of that racial 
tyranny, at least in the formal legal sense, was washed away through 
federal legislative action in the Civil Rights Act of 196412 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965,13 part of the larger civil rights movement 
establishing national rights protected by the federal government and 
enforced by its judiciary. Whatever it may today mean as a matter of 
rights protection, though, federalism may retain not only an important 
but also a tyrannical place in the ordering of a modern constitutional 
federal democracy. Tyranny exists not because it confers unlimited 
sovereign powers upon a government to act within the sphere of its 
jurisdictional competence, but through the way in which it divides, 
separates, and thereby fragments power among more than one unit and 
level of government. This is certainly true with respect to the allocation 
of governmental power among not only national but also state and  
even local or municipal levels of government14 concerning the 
environment,15 and natural resources and their use.16 In this Article, we 
 
11 BORK, supra note 5, at 52. 
12 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-108). 
13 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-108) 
(formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971). But see Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 
(2013). 
14 See AUSTL. LOCAL GOV’T ASS’N, FUTURE FOCUSED NGA19 CONFERENCE 
HANDBOOK (June 16, 2019), https://www.nga19.com.au/NGA19-Handbook-Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R3UR-SRAJ]. The Australian Local Government Association Annual 
Conference 2019 is entitled “Future Focused” and seeks to address key themes surrounding 
the difficulties inherent in coordinating federal, state, and local responses to climate change, 
water use, and recycling. Id. 
15 See Lydia B. Hoover, The Commerce Clause, Federalism and Environmentalism: At 
Odds After Olin?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 735 (1997). 
16 Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions provide examples of the 
difficulties surrounding a bifurcated, federal application of governmental power over 
integrated natural resources: Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016); Sturgeon v. Frost, 
139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) 
set aside 104 million acres of federally owned land in Alaska for preservation purposes. 
With that land, ANILCA created ten new national parks, monuments, and preserves (areas 
known as “conservation system units”) (16 U.S.C.A. § 3102(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
116-91)); in sketching those units’ boundary lines, Congress made an uncommon choice—
to follow natural features rather than enclose only federally owned lands. It thus swept in a 
vast set of so-called inholdings—more than 18 million acres of state, Native, and private 
land. Had Congress done nothing more, those inholdings could have become subject to 
many National Park Service rules, as the Service has broad authority under its Organic Act 
to administer both lands and waters within parks across the country (54 U.S.C.A. § 100751  
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argue that this tyranny is especially true, even acutely so, in the case of 
water. 
Moving water to where humans want to use it has long challenged 
communities; indeed, “[t]he power of water over history is a very old 
discovery.”17 Great civilizations that arose in deserts—China, India, 
Arizona, and the Middle East—depended upon water for their 
existence and their success, coming to be known as “hydraulic 
societies.”18 And even those societies that emerged in places where 
water was seemingly abundant nonetheless understood the importance 
of water to their survival and developed a system of rights in order to 
deal with its allocation.19 In every case, 
[w]ater has been critical to the making of human history. It has 
shaped institutions, destroyed cities, set limits to expansion, brought 
feast and famine, carried goods to market, washed away sickness, 
divided nations, inspired the worship and beseeching of gods, given 
philosophers a metaphor for existence, and disposed of garbage. To 
write history without putting any water in it is to leave out a large 
part of the story. Human experience has not been so dry as that.20 
In the modern world, our ongoing attempts to master water, 
emblematic of “hydraulic societies,” seem increasingly feeble, even 
futile, often producing bizarre anomalies: water costs are lower in the 
middle of deserts than they are in places with seemingly abundant fresh 
water supplies.21 Crops that require abundant water—such as cotton  
 
 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91))); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 
(2019) (an attempt by Virginia Uranium, Inc. to mine raw uranium ore from a site near Coles 
Hill, Virginia; Virginia law flatly prohibits uranium mining in the state. The company filed 
suit, alleging that, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) preempts state uranium mining laws like Virginia’s and ensconces the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) as the lone regulator in the field. The District Court, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court rejected the company’s argument, finding that while 
the AEA affords the NRC considerable authority over the nuclear fuel life cycle, it offers no 
hint that Congress sought to strip states of their traditional power to regulate mining on 
private lands within their borders). 
17 DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST 19 (1992) (Pantheon Books 1985). 
18 Id. at 37. 
19 See, e.g., CYNTHIA JORDAN BANNON, GARDENS AND NEIGHBORS: PRIVATE WATER 
RIGHTS IN ROMAN ITALY (2009). 
20 WORSTER, supra note 17, at 19. 
21 Water Costs Balloon in Cities Along the Great Lakes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 9, 2019, 
4:41 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/water-costs-balloon-in-cities-along-the-
great-lakes [https://perma.cc/XYX3-BTXG]. 
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and rice—are grown in the middle of deserts.22 Water is transported, in 
vast networks of concrete canals, great distances from where it flows 
in natural watercourses to service the needs of cities, which should not 
be where they are.23 Water, as it always has, continues to present 
significant challenges of allocation, management, and use. 
Applied to this story of water use, does federalism effect tyranny? 
The answer to this question begins with the public-private divide. In 
Property and Sovereignty, Morris R. Cohen argued that property is 
sovereignty, a grant of state power to individuals with respect to a given 
thing, good, or resource.24 By using the concept of sovereignty to 
describe property, Cohen draws a distinction between, on the one hand, 
the public form of that power—imperium, residing in the state—to 
create property and to confer it upon the individual, and, on the other, 
the private form of that power—dominium, allowing individual control 
over and use of a good or resource.25 Cohen succinctly demonstrates 
that property involves two allocations and two exercises of power, of 
sovereignty: first, that of the state in its political sovereignty to create 
and confer a form of power known as property on individuals and, 
second, the power in fact conferred on the individual, a lesser form of 
sovereignty, but sovereignty all the same.26 Property is the power of the 
state to create and confer property and it is the power so conferred on 
the individual.27 
So, too, the treatment of natural resources in a federal constitutional 
system involves two allocations of power, one on each side of the 
public-private divide: the allocation of jurisdictional competence to 
deal with the resource, on the public side of the divide, and the 
allocation of the power to use the resource, on the private. The former 
is a matter of the constitution, the latter one of property. Both involve 
power to control a natural resource, whatever it might be. David Singh 
Grewal puts it this way: 
At the heart of this distinction between publicly accountable power 
and decentralized commercial activity [the public-private divide] is a 
 
22 See Kerry Brewster, Murray-Darling Irrigators File Class Action Seeking $750m 
from Basin Authority, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
australia-news/2019/may/14/murray-darling-irrigators-file-class-action-seeking-750m-
from-basin-authority [https://perma.cc/58VE-EU53]. 
23 See Crisis on the Colorado, YALEENVIRONMENT360, https://e360.yale.edu/series/ 
crisis-on-the-colorado [https://perma.cc/U92K-CWH3] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
24 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927). 
25 Id. at 8–9. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 12–13. 
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conception of individual property rights as providing relative 
insulation from direct political control—though, of course, that 
insulation is itself achieved only through the careful deployment of 
political power to enforce those rights in the first place.28 
In an earlier article, we examined the private side of this divide as 
applied to water.29 We argued that as water becomes an increasingly 
scarce resource, a lack of clarity in relation to its use can produce both 
conflict among and inefficient use by its users.30 This, in turn, exerts 
pressure on the state to “propertize” the water resource as a means of 
encouraging markets in water and ensuring the viability and 
functionality of those markets.31 Yet, we conclude, this process of 
propertization of water ought carefully to be monitored so as to prevent 
the very outcome sought to be avoided: fragmented control producing 
inefficient use and what some call “anticommons tragedies.”32 
In this Article, we consider the deployment of public power over the 
water resource. Federalism, like property, fragments control by 
dividing and separating power. While fragmentation might work to 
some extent for relatively discrete aspects of public power, such as 
those with respect to going to war,33 entering treaties,34 issuing 
money,35 and raising and maintaining armed forces,36 when applied to 
 
28 David Singh Grewal, The Legal Constitution of Capitalism, in AFTER PIKETTY:  
THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 483 (Heather Boushey et al. eds., 2017);  
see also David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014); 
KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY (2019). 
29 Paul Babie, Paul Leadbeter & Kyriaco Nikias, Property, Unbundled Water 
Entitlements, and Anticommons Tragedies: A Cautionary Tale from Australia, 9 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 107 (2020). The concept of anticommons tragedies was developed in 
the seminal work of Michael A. Heller. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); MICHAEL 
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, 
STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
30 Babie, Leadbeter & Nikias, supra note 29. 
31 This “propertization” of our modern world is a trend of the last 100–200 years of 
human history. See C.B. MACPHERSON, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL 
POSITIONS (1978); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
32 Babie, Leadbeter & Nikias, supra note 29. 
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; Australian Constitution, s 51(vi). 
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Australian Constitution, s 51(xxix). 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; Australian Constitution, s 51(xii). 
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. II, § 2; Australian Constitution, s 51(vi). Of 
course, it is important to note that even seemingly straightforward powers, such as that with 
respect to marriage, can become an unforeseen minefield of national-state conflict: see 
Megan Lawson & Paul Babie, The Law of Marriage Equality in Australia: The Shortest 
Distance Between Two Points?, in INTERFACE THEOLOGY: APPLIED ETHICS 1 (John Capper 
& Philip Kariatlis eds., 2017). 
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water, questions immediately arise: which unit of government gets to 
decide about the allocation of private power—property. Which unit of 
government can deal with those challenges that transcend formal 
boundaries, such as the environment? This matters because “[n]ature, 
the environment, or even single complex ecosystems are seldom easily 
quantifiable as bounded entities with geographically clear borders.”37 
A river certainly cannot be broken up that way; in any form, scarce 
water38 rejects the arbitrary boundaries established by humans between 
levels, units, or branches of government. The “‘problem of the rivers’ 
[is] an ancient and familiar one, since river-waters [are] essential to 
man’s life and activities, [yet] nature care[s] nothing for his territorial 
boundaries.”39 Thus, 
[w]ithin the complex spectrum of establishing where a legal subject 
ends and another begins . . . rivers are somewhat more easily 
identifiable, their very being premised on historicized boundaries that 
measure their watery ambit from riverbed to riverbank. And yet, 
rivers still elude a final, clearly defined, and uncontroversial 
description. As a result, rivers inhabit a liminal space, one that is at 
the same time somewhat geographically bounded and yet 
metaphorically transcendent, physically shifting, and culturally 
porous.40 
A river is a unitary, integrated, single entity, which in turn is a part 
of the unitary, integrated, single entity that is nature, the environment 
itself. A river defies the borders and boundaries and the management 
“solutions” imposed upon it by something as arbitrary as federalism. 
Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical river flowing through all lower 
forty-eight coterminous or contiguous states. Using Sutton’s approach 
to federalism, that river is potentially subject to the law of forty-nine 
different jurisdictions—one for each state and the U.S. federal 
government—with forty-nine “imperfect solutions” to its management. 
Put those solutions together and one is left not with a useful laboratory 
of approaches, but chaos. This is no mere hypothetical scenario: the 
Mississippi River Basin takes in thirty-two of the contiguous states; the 
 
37 Cristy Clark et al., Can You Hear the Rivers Sing? Legal Personhood, Ontology, and 
the Nitty-Gritty of Governance, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 787, 791 (2018) (arguing for the 
recognition of rivers as “legal persons”). 
38 Sydneysiders, for instance, are now under enforced water restrictions. See Samantha 
Dick, Sydney Water Restrictions Enforced Early Amid NSW Drought, NEW DAILY (May 29, 
2019, 10:29 PM), https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/national/2019/05/29/water-restrictions-
in-sydney/?utm_source=Adestra&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MorningNews-
20190530 [https://perma.cc/KU86-JGZE]. 
39 J.A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 154–55 (1972). 
40 Clark et al., supra note 37. 
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Columbia River, ten; and the Colorado River, seven. And most 
constitutional federal democracies reveal the same potential for the 
fragmentation of power with respect to water: in Australia, the Murray-
Darling Basin (the largest river system on the continent) takes in fully 
four of the six mainland states and one of its territories.41 In the case of 
the interstate watercourses found there, while actors continue to seek a 
political solution to a problem bequeathed to us by constitutional 
federalism,42 coordinated action is virtually impossible and almost 
certain to prove elusive due to the “complex interplay of diverse 
interests.”43 
And so federalism represents tyranny to the river and its water; the 
tyranny, first, of the fragmentation of power with respect to an 
integrated whole—the interstate watercourse—and, second, the 
tyranny of inaction and ineffectuality in its attempts to provide 
coordinated management of a water resource by its very nature 
incapable of fragmentation. To adapt the Heraclitean epigraph to this 
Article, federalism means that government tries not only to enter the 
river twice but many times. In this Article, which contains five parts, 
we consider federalism’s tyranny over water through a comparative 
assessment of two constitutional federal systems and through an 
examination of the distribution of powers in those systems: the United 
States and California, and Australia and South Australia. While the 
Article deals with surface interstate watercourses in those jurisdictions 
 
41 Australia comprises five contiguous mainland States (New South Wales, Queensland, 
South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia), one offshore State (Tasmania), three 
contiguous mainland, or internal Territories (Australian Capital Territory, Northern 
Territory, and Jervis Bay Territory), and seven offshore or external Territories (Ashmore 
and Cartier Islands, Australian Antarctic Territory, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands, Coral Sea Islands, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Norfolk Island). Cities, 
States and Territories, AUSTL., https://www.australia.com/en-us/facts-and-planning/about-
australia/cities-states-and-territories.html [https://perma.cc/D77U-GAEH] (last visited Mar. 
20, 2020). 
42 See, e.g., Adam Webster, A Referendum Won’t Save the Murray-Darling Basin, 
CONVERSATION (May 12, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.theconversation.com/a-referendum 
-wont-save-the-murray-darling-basin-116750 [https://perma.cc/P33Y-8B26]; Michael 
Stewardson, How Did It Come to This?, PURSUIT (Jan. 22, 2019), https://pursuit. 
unimelb.edu.au/articles/how-did-it-come-to-this-1906 [https://perma.cc/W88A-BKDC]; 
Univ. N.S.W., What an Effective Murray-Darling Water Policy Should Look Like, AUSTL.’S 
SCI. CHANNEL, https://australiascience.tv/what-an-effective-murray-darling-water-policy-
should-look-like [https://perma.cc/D99U-R9AM] (last updated Mar. 28, 2019); Stan. Univ. 
Rural W. Initiative, What Seven States Can Agree to Do: Deal-Making on the Colorado 
River, WATER EDUC. FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.watereducation.org/aquafornia-
news/what-seven-states-can-agree-do-deal-making-colorado-river  
[https://perma.cc/WA49-LZL5]. 
43 Lon L. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1042 (1965). 
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generally, our focus is the main interstate rivers which provide water 
supply: in the case of California, the Colorado River and its basin, and 
in the case of South Australia, the River Murray and the Murray-
Darling Basin.44 
Part I of the Article examines the constitutional settlements with 
respect to water resources found in the United States and Australia. We 
look first at the concept of federalism itself, before turning our focus to 
the division of power as it concerns water resources between the 
national government—the federal government in the United States, and 
the Commonwealth government in Australia—and the state 
governments in each jurisdiction. While our analysis applies equally to 
the relationship of any of the American states to the federal government 
or of the Australian states to the Commonwealth government, we 
consider here that relationship as it applies to California in the case of 
the former and South Australia in the case of the latter. 
Part II recounts attempts in both jurisdictions to use what is known 
as “cooperative,” “flexible,” or “marble-cake” federalism to overcome 
the problems created by the federal division of powers over water 
resources. In the case of the United States-California relationship, we 
examine “The Law of the River,” which governs water in the Colorado 
River; in the case of Australia-South Australia, we review the various 
attempts to establish a framework for the allocation and use of Murray-
Darling water. In both cases, we conclude that these attempts at 
cooperative or flexible solutions have failed, for the very reasons that 
they are founded in the principle of federalism. 
In Parts III and IV, we explore the nature of existing disputes and 
emerging challenges that arise as a consequence of the federal division 
of power over water resources. These are: overallocation and overuse 
of the resource relative to land use planning and instream or ecological 
flows of water; First Nations or Indigenous cultural flows of water; 
international obligations with respect to the water resource; and, 
 
44 While many of the federalism issues that we address here apply also to groundwater, 
that area of law does differ with respect to surface water, largely surface water of rivers. Of 
course, while the lack of coordination between those two bodies of law with respect to one 
natural resource—water—is itself a problem of federalism, we restrict our discussion here 
to the surface water, and of that, mainly to the rivers that water California and South 
Australia. Yet, our analysis could be applied to groundwater as well. We leave a full analysis 
of groundwater law, though, to future research. For the law of groundwater in the two 
jurisdictions considered in this Article, see, for California, 2 SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA 
WATER LAW AND POLICY (2019) [hereinafter SLATER 2] and, for South Australia, Kate 
Stoeckel, Romany Webb & Julia Green, Rights to Access and Use of Water, in AUSTRALIAN 
WATER LAW 83–220, 136–52 (Kate Stoeckel et al. eds., 2012). 
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perhaps the most significant and potentially the most intractable 
challenge from the perspective of federalism, climate change. 
In the Conclusion, we reflect upon the enormity of the challenges: 
climate change, the allocation of water among more than one nation, 
and the inability of federalism to cope as those challenges increase in 
severity. Still, federalism seems here to stay, notwithstanding its 
inability to provide workable solutions for water management. This 
may prompt some to suggest that this Article is nothing but a thought 
experiment and that our time might have been more usefully spent on 
suggesting ways in which these challenges could be addressed within 
the existing federal framework. Our response: it remains important that 
we understand the weaknesses of federalism to deal with these 
challenges. It is only in understanding the frailties that we might better 
understand what federalism must do in order to adapt and respond to 
the challenges it faces. We live in an empirical world and, for that 
reason, we argue that we must not only understand the challenges found 
there but also respond to them. What that may hold for the future of 
federalism we cannot say. But what we can say is that federalism must 
be rethought, and urgently so. 
I 
CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENTS: ALLOCATING POWER  
OVER WATER 
In order to understand the problems federalism creates in the 
allocation of governmental control over a natural resource like water, 
it is first necessary to understand what federalism is. The first section 
of this part briefly examines the nature of federalism. Having set that 
background, we turn to the way in which the United States and 
Australia use federalism to divide control over water between the 
federal and state governments—focusing on California and South 
Australia. 
A. Federalism 
Federalism, first devised in the late 18th century in the time between 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 (considered “the seminal era of constitution 
writing”45), establishes “a system of associated governments with a 
 
45 SUTTON, supra note 7, at 11; see Gordon S. Wood, State Constitution-Making in the 
American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911 (1993); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969). Of course, the bedrock upon which all  
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vertical division of governments into national and regional components 
having different responsibilities.”46 This process is known as the 
“division of powers” between the national and regional levels of 
government.47 In the United States, the government responsible for the 
national interest is known as the federal government; in Australia, this 
level of government is known as either the federal or the 
Commonwealth government. In both countries, the states and their 
governments bear responsibility at the regional level. 
A further separation of power is then affected within each level of 
government, separating the executive, legislative, and judicial 
spheres—this is well known as the “separation of powers.”48 As Sutton 
explains: 
In “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,” the Framers created 
American federalism, a unique way of dividing governmental power 
and a unique way of aggregating it. That innovation and the many 
compromises that came with it make the U.S. Constitution a rightly 
celebrated framework of government. The horizontal separations of 
power among the three branches of the national government, together 
with the vertical separation of powers between the national 
government and the States, provide the soundest protection of liberty 
any people has known.49 
When a constitution separates powers, what is it separating? It is 
hard to say, but George Paton suggested that 
[a]lthough in political theory much has been made of the vital 
importance of the separation of powers, it is extraordinarily difficult 
to define precisely each particular power. In an ideal state we might 
imagine a legislature which had supreme and exclusive power to lay 
down general rules for the future without reference to particular 
cases; courts whose sole function was to make binding orders to settle 
disputes between individuals which were brought before them by 
applying these rules to the facts which were found to exist; an 
administrative body which carried on the business of government by 
issuing particular orders or making decisions of policy within the 
narrow confines of rules of law that it could not change. The 
 
theorizing about federalism builds is the FEDERALIST PAPERS (1787–1788). See Madison, 
supra note 2; Anti-Federalist Papers, CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.constitution.org/afp.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E7Y7-FMZQ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
46 Federal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
47 Division of Powers, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
48 The earliest formulation of the separation of powers is traceable to JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689) and later to CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT,  
BARON DE LA BRÈDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748); see Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49 SUTTON, supra note 7, at 11 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes 
the law.50 
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity around the separation of powers, 
we can say at least this much: both the division and the separation of 
powers are integral parts of a federalism, a federal structure of 
government.51 Laurence Tribe concludes: 
Just as the Colossus once strode the wine-dark waters of the harbor 
of Rhodes, so the separation of powers (along with its vertical 
counterpart, sometimes called the “division of powers” that 
constitutes federalism) commands and pervades American 
constitutional law.52 
The conclusion is the same for both the United States and Australia: 
federalism divides and separates power, and thereby fragments53 
responsibility between the federal/Commonwealth government and the 
state governments, each of which establishes its own apparatus of 
executive, legislative, and judicial power. 
What responsibility, though, does each level—national and local—
enjoy within a federal system, and what power does each unit of 
government, executive, legislative, and judicial, enjoy within that 
system? While it depends upon the relevant constitution, two broad 
approaches seem common. The Canadian Constitution, for instance, 
confers upon the national government and the local governments a list 
of coextensive enumerated spheres of legislative responsibility over 
which that level of government enjoys exclusive power; a residue 
clause reserves power over any matters not otherwise enumerated in 
either the national or the local list to the former.54 In contrast to the 
Canadian model, which we might call “equality of distribution,” the 
Australian Constitution enumerates a list of powers reserved 
exclusively to the Commonwealth government,55 with any matters not 
otherwise found in that list reserved to the states.56 And in the United 
States, powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to 
 
50 GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 293 (David P. 
Derham ed., 3rd ed. 1964). 
51 For a full background to the federal structure established by the United States 
Constitution, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15–19 (Found. 
Press 3rd ed. 2000). 
52 Id. at 124. 
53 Id. 
54 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 
5 (Can.), ss. 91–92. 
55 GEOFFREY SAWER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM IN THE COURTS 15–16 (1967). 
56 Australian Constitution, s 51; see SAWER, supra note 55, at 16–17. 
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the states or to the people.57 We might call the Australian and American 
variants “asymmetrical distribution,” with federalism leaving scope for 
the “states as sole regulators of areas left beyond federal power.”58 
Why should federalism matter? Whatever model a nation selects—
equality or asymmetry—why does understanding what federalism 
means make a difference? Why does it matter in working out what 
governments may do with respect to the control of the water resource? 
Bork’s tyranny and Sutton’s solutions go to the heart of the difficulty: 
division results in internecine struggles over where the power resides 
over a given head of competence, often times leaving no one with the 
effective control over a given matter, such as natural resources.59 Sutton 
sets out where federalism has gone wrong in relation to the protection 
of human rights, but his analysis is equally applicable to natural 
resources; indeed, the faults of federalism may be even more acute in 
the case of water: 
What we have today is not an inevitable feature of the Framers’ 
vision [of federalism]. It is in reality quite remote from anything the 
Framers could have imagined. The original constitutional plan 
created largely exclusive federal and state spheres of power as 
opposed to largely overlapping spheres of power. Which makes 
sense: Why would a libertarian group of Framers, skeptical of 
governmental power and intent on dividing it in all manner of ways, 
have doubled the governmental bodies that could regulate the lives 
of Americans? And tripled and quadrupled them if one accounts for 
cities and counties? A system of largely separate dual sovereignty 
(federal or state power in most areas) has become a system of largely 
overlapping dual sovereignty (federal and state power in most areas). 
Good or bad, textually justified or not, this feature of American 
government is not going away. American constitutional law today 
thus permits at least two sets of regulations in every corner of the 
country and what comes with it: the potential for dual challenges to 
the validity of most state or local laws.60 
This is the very problem revealed by an examination of the 
allocation of private power—property—over water: inefficient use and  
 
 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
58 BORK, supra note 5. 
59 BORK, supra note 5, at 139; SUTTON, supra note 7, at 19. 
60 SUTTON, supra note 7, at 13–14 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in the original); see 
TRIBE, supra note 51, at 124 (explaining that “along both dimensions, that of federalism 
[division of powers] as well as that of separation of powers, it is institutional 
interdependence rather than functional independence that best summarizes the American 
idea of protecting liberty by fragmenting power.” In other words, in order for a federal 
system to act with respect to any matter often requires some form of cooperation, often both 
among branches of government and between different levels of government.). 
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anticommons tragedies. And while the consequences of this state of 
affairs for fundamental rights might be dire, it is much more troubling 
in the case of water, for it renders impossible the potential for either 
federal or state governments effectively and comprehensively to 
manage the whole of the water resource. Instead, both levels of 
government can deal only with some aspects of the water resource, 
leading to significant problems, which we consider in Part III. 
Before turning to those problems, though, we first consider the way 
in which power over water is divided between the federal and state 
governments in the U.S. and Australian Constitutions and, second, how 
those constitutional settlements necessitate “cooperative,” “flexible,” 
or “marble cake” federalism between federal and state governments. 
B. Water 
1. United States 
The U.S. Constitution nowhere expressly mentions water or 
governmental control over its allocation. As such, the powers enjoyed 
by the federal and state governments are either found within an express 
delegation of power or are reasonably implied from the powers of the 
federal government, which may touch upon the allocation and use of 
water.61 While the federal government enjoys paramount power with 
respect to any powers conferred upon it,62 powers either implied or not 
expressly granted to the federal government are reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment63 to the states or to the people,64 making water largely a 
matter of state competence.65 
 
61 For an overview of the powers of the federal and state governments concerning water, 
see IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., LAW OF THE RIVER: RESOURCE GUIDE 4–14 (2018). 
62 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see 3 PRESIDENT’S WATER RESOURCES 
POLICY COMMISSION REPORT: WATER RESOURCES LAW 70–71 (1950) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S REPORT]. 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
64 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 5–6, 70–72; see also Ernest A. Engelbert, 
Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 326–28 
(1957). 
65 See 1 SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY § 1.02[2]–[7], 
§§ 1.10–1.11 (2019) [hereinafter SLATER 1]; SLATER 2, supra note 44, § 12.02. 
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a. Federal Powers 
The place of water in U.S. constitutional law is the subject of great 
complexity, allowing for extensive administrative institutional bodies 
with power over the allocation of water.66 
However, it is possible to summarize seven express provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution conferring upon the federal government power which 
may touch upon the allocation and use of the water resource:67 
commerce,68 property,69 war,70 treaty-making,71 general welfare,72 
equitable apportionment,73 and interstate compacts.74 And because of 
the separation of powers, it is possible to group these according to each 
branch of government capable of exercising them, for “the powers 
confided by the Constitution to one branch cannot be exercised by 
another. Nor is Congress ‘permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, 
the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.’”75 Thus, 
Congress is vested with exclusive power with respect to commerce, 
property, conducting war, the general welfare, and entering interstate 
compacts; the President with declaring war and treaty-making; and the  
 
 
66 See INST. WATER RES., ASPECTS OF GOVERNING WATER ALLOCATION IN THE U.S. 
13–35 (2014); Ray Huffaker et al., The Uneasy Hierarchy of Federal and State Water Laws 
and Policies, 118 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 3 (2001). 
67 For an exhaustive review of the federal powers considered in this part, see TRIBE, 
supra note 51, at chs. 3–5. 
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a detailed analysis of the law surrounding this 
provision, see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 8–29. See also Sho Sato, Water 
Resources—Comments upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 43 (1960). 
69 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For a detailed analysis of the law surrounding this 
provision, see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 29–54. See also Sato, supra note 68. 
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. For a detailed analysis of the 
law surrounding this provision, see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 54–55. 
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a detailed analysis of the law surrounding this 
provision, see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 56–57. 
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a detailed analysis of the law surrounding this provision, 
see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 57–58. 
73 This power derives from the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over all cases in 
which a state is a party: U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. For a detailed analysis of the law 
surrounding this provision, see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 58–64. See also 
Lauren D. Bernadett, Equitable Apportionment in the Supreme Court: An Overview of the 
Doctrine and the Factors Considered by the Supreme Court in Light of Florida v. Georgia, 
29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 511 (2014). 
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. For a detailed analysis of the law surrounding this provision, 
see PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 64–70. 
75 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 64–70 (citing Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 
87, 119 (1925)); Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880); Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 
(1920). 
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Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to determine equitable 
apportionments of water and to interpret interstate water compacts 
between states. Still, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
respective branches, “Congress is expressly empowered to make all 
laws ‘necessary and proper’ for carrying into execution its expressly 
delegated powers and ‘all other Powers’ vested by the Constitution in 
the Federal Government.”76 
The powers with respect to commerce and property provide 
Congress the most comprehensive power with respect to water. The 
Commerce Clause confers power to act in furtherance of commerce, 
paramount to any riparian rights under state law concerning (1) control 
of navigable waters, and, if navigation or commerce is affected, the 
non-navigable waterways at the headwaters or non-navigable 
tributaries of such waters; (2) protection against floods; and (3) the 
development of a watershed.77 The Property Clause confers upon 
Congress the unlimited authority to control the use of federal public 
lands, which, while allowing states to create rights to use water in 
streams on such land, does not allow for the rights of the United States 
to be thereby destroyed.78 Congress has used this power to recognize 
the prior appropriation doctrine for waters on public lands in the 
western United States, and to establish the federal property right in 
electrical energy generated by water falling through a federal dam.79 
The presidential powers with respect to treaty-making and declaring 
war (and, indeed, the power of Congress to wage it) have received little 
judicial attention, although the former power has “existing and 
potential significance, particularly as to international streams. Also, by 
treaties with western tribes of Indians, the United States has reserved 
rights to use of waters and exempted them from appropriation under 
state laws.”80 
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction with respect to equitable 
apportionment of interstate waters between states, when combined with 
the interstate compacts power of Congress, establishes an important 
power used extensively throughout the history of the republic. The 
former “is a doctrine that was created by the Supreme Court to ensure 
that each state can enforce its right to an equal share of common 
 
76 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 8 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
77 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 9–11 (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316 (1819)). 
78 For a recent example, see Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019). 
79 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 71–72. 
80 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 72. 
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waters.”81 When operating in conjunction with the congressional power 
to enter interstate compacts, this establishes the principle that 
[e]very state has a right to an equal share of interstate waters. When 
states dispute the share of water to which they are entitled, the dispute 
can be resolved by interstate apportionment compact, Congressional 
apportionment, or an equitable apportionment suit with the Supreme 
Court. Equitable apportionment cases arise under the Court’s original 
and exclusive jurisdiction. 
Original jurisdiction allows states to file a lawsuit directly with the 
Supreme Court rather than starting at a district court, appealing to a 
circuit court, and appealing again to the Supreme Court. Further, 
when the lawsuit is between multiple states, as in an equitable 
apportionment case, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. A 
state that is being sued cannot claim sovereign immunity to avoid an 
original jurisdiction action because Article III . . . acts as a waiver of 
any state sovereign immunity. 
In an equitable apportionment lawsuit, state citizens are the 
beneficiaries of any relief granted by the Supreme Court. But the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from suing another state over 
interstate water rights. Thus, to avoid violating the Eleventh 
Amendment in equitable apportionment cases, states act in a parens 
patriae capacity even though state citizens are the ultimate 
beneficiaries.82 
This dual interstate compacts-equitable apportionment power—as 
demonstrated in the Arizona v. California litigation, which began in 
1931 and remains ongoing83—provides for the interaction of federal 
judicial and legislative powers, cultivating a fertile source of 
 
81 Bernadett, supra note 73, at 514 (citing A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 
AND RESOURCES § 10:2 (2014 ed., 1988)). The doctrine, first established in Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), was further elaborated on in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 
419 (1922), and is best known for Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); 292 U.S. 341 
(1934); 298 U.S. 558 (1936); 373 U.S. 546 (1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964); 383 U.S. 268 
(1966); 439 U.S. 419 (1979); 460 U.S. 605 (1983); 466 U.S. 144 (1984); 531 U.S. 1 (2000). 
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), specified the amount of water to which Arizona 
was entitled under the Colorado River Compact of 1922; this demonstrates the interaction 
of the Supreme Court’s equitable apportionment and the Congressional interstate compact 
powers. A recent application of the doctrine is found in Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 
(2018). See also PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 72. 
82 Bernadett, supra note 73, at 513–14 (citing A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER 
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 10:1–10:3, 10:07, 10:10 (2014 ed. 1988)); Douglas L. Grant, 
Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When Virtue of Performance Becomes the Vice of 
Inflexibility, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (2003); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw through Pub. 
L. 116-91); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). See also 
PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 72. 
83 See infra Section II.A.2. 
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potentially cooperative or flexible federalism. We will return to this 
issue in Parts II and III.84 
b. State Powers 
When the federal government legislates within its sphere of 
competence, the Supremacy Clause ensures that such law is the 
“supreme law of the land.”85 This power, operating in concert with the 
preemption doctrine developed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, results in relevant federal legislation preempting state law, even 
in the case of state and federal laws that conflict with one another.86 As 
a general matter, in the absence of any federal law, however, a state law 
will operate, but only until such time as the federal government might 
legislate. Alternatively, where conflict might otherwise occur, the two 
spheres of government can cooperate with respect to a given matter.87 
The question then arises as to which powers the states exclusively 
enjoy in relation to water. An initial distinction must be drawn between 
interstate waters (flowing through more than one state) and those 
entirely within one state. In the case of the former, “on the whole, the 
federal government’s powers have been used to guide and control the 
development of major streams in the country.”88 In the case of the latter, 
as the owner of all resources “occurring wholly within [its] borders,”89 
and because the Tenth Amendment ensures that undelegated powers 
are reserved to the states, a state has “greater responsibility for the 
distribution and use of waters locally.”90 
The powers reserved to the states with respect to water fall into three 
broad categories. First, the “police power” allows for the regulation of 
“various water activities for the general welfare, such as the production 
of water for domestic purposes or the control of sewage disposal,”91  
 
 
84 For an overview and analysis of the jurisprudence dealing with this dual power, see 
Bernadett, supra note 73, at 513–14. And for the prevalence of cooperative federalism in 
water, see Engelbert, supra note 64, at 345. 
85 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
86 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 
(2008); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). For an exhaustive review of the powers of 
the states relative to the federal government, see TRIBE, supra note 51, at ch. 6. 
87 Based upon the Supremacy Clause of U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and the U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
88 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 327. 
89 TRIBE, supra note 51, at 1085. 
90 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 327. 
91 Id. 
BABIE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:14 PM 
20 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 35, 1 
and “for the protection of health, safety, and welfare, including [public] 
trust resources, such as fish and wildlife.”92 Second, states enjoy “the 
power to determine the allocation and distribution of both surface and 
underground waters within the state. The states are permitted to adopt 
whatever system of water law they choose, including the law for those 
lands which have passed from the federal government to the states, 
provided it does not conflict with the federal government’s powers over 
navigation.”93 This allows for the entirety of state water resources law, 
which governs the allocation and use of water not otherwise subject to 
federal jurisdiction.94 And third, states may exercise “powers to engage 
in interstate action with respect to water use and development.”95 Of 
greatest significance here are those instances of cooperative or flexible 
federalism resulting in interstate compacts, as we will see in Part III in 
relation to the Colorado River Compact of 1922.96 
2. Australia 
Unlike its U.S. counterpart, the Australian Constitution expressly 
mentions water—once expressly and once impliedly—in a way that 
creates more confusion than clarity about the division of water and 
power.97 This, in itself, is unsurprising. If the “rivers question”98 or the 
“problem of the rivers”99 “had not been settled there could have been 
no Constitution and no federation.”100 The delegates to the Australian 
constitutional conventions of the 1890s devoted significant attention 
and time to debating the rivers question, by which 
‘rivers’ meant the Murray-Darling system. In effect the argument 
about the use of the waters of this one great inland system in a vast 
dry continent concerned New South Wales, Victoria and South  
 
 
92 SLATER 1, supra note 65, § 13.03[3]. We consider the public trust doctrine below in 
Section IV.A. 
93 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 327. Thus, “[t]o remove any question concerning water 
rights in states created out of federal territory, the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, as 
amended, 43 U.S.C. §321 (1952), in effect provided that all non-navigable waters on these 
lands should be reserved for public use under state law.” Id. at n.7. 
94 See, e.g., SLATER 1, supra note 65, § 1.02[1]. 
95 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 327. 
96 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
97 Paul Kildea & George Williams, The Constitution and the Management of Water in 
Australia’s Rivers, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 595, 601–03 (2010). 
98 LA NAUZE, supra note 39, at 153–55. 
99 Id. at 210. 
100 Id. at 208. See also Sandford D. Clark, The River Murray Question: Part I – Colonial 
Days, 8 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 11 (1971); Adam Webster, A Colonial History of the River 
Murray Dispute, 38 ADEL. L. REV. 13 (2017). 
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Australia only, for though some of the sources of the Darling lay 
within Queensland the points at issue would have worried her little 
even if she had been represented. The use of the river-waters, whether 
by conservation schemes to provide for consumption by man and 
animals, by irrigation schemes for agriculture, or as highways for 
navigation, affected all three States, though their anxieties were 
concentrated in different degrees on these various matters.101 
In short, for the three concerned states, water was power. The 
difficulty in settling the division of governmental control over water, 
and thus over power, centered on the conflict over the Murray-Darling 
Basin and its tributaries between the southeastern colonies. Victoria 
and New South Wales sought economic development through 
irrigating and thus cultivating otherwise arid or low rainfall land, while 
South Australia sought to ensure sufficient flows in the Murray-Darling 
system to protect its burgeoning river trade.102 This struggle between 
the three resulted in the inclusion of two conflicting provisions 
conferring power upon the Commonwealth government.103 
a. Commonwealth Powers 
In addressing the rivers question, the delegates of the constitutional 
conventions ultimately settled on two provisions, sections 98 and 100: 
Section 98: 
The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to trade and 
commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to railways the 
property of any State. 
Section 100: 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or 
commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to 
the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or 
irrigation.104 
Read together, what do these two provisions mean? On their face, 
they appear to create conflicting power for the Commonwealth 
government. On the one hand, section 98 confers upon the 
Commonwealth the power to make laws with respect to trade and 
 
101 LA NAUZE, supra note 39, at 154. 
102 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 601. 
103 Sandford D. Clark, The River Murray Question: Part II – Federation, Agreement and 
Future Alternatives, 8 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 215 (1971). 
104 For an overview of these powers, and the federal and state powers concerning water 
resources considered in this part, see JOHN PYKE, GOVERNMENT POWERS UNDER A 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA (2017). 
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commerce, including navigation and shipping; while on the other hand, 
section 100 seems to limit that right with respect to water itself. 
Section 98 operates as a declaration, clarifying the operation of 
section 51(i) of the constitution, which confers upon the 
Commonwealth government the “power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . 
trade and commerce with other countries, and among the states.”105 In 
other words, “[i]t is in effect a definition clause, declaring that trade 
and commerce includes traffic by water as well as by land.”106 It is, 
therefore, similar in its effect to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.107 
Section 98 satisfied South Australia that its interests in river trade 
along the Murray-Darling system would be protected through the 
power of the Commonwealth. But what about Victoria and New South 
Wales? Both these states “viewed [section] 98 as a potential threat to 
their growing interest in irrigation. They were concerned that 
Commonwealth action to ensure river navigability could potentially 
supersede their interests in using water for irrigation purposes.”108 This 
concern prompted the inclusion of section 100, which vested the 
Commonwealth with power to ensure the reasonable use of river waters 
for conservation or irrigation in upstream states.109 Thus, in the event 
of a conflict between navigation and reasonable use within a state, “the 
power of the Federal Parliament to regulate navigation would have 
prevailed absolutely against any claims by the States to the use of the 
water, and the object of this section is to limit the paramountcy of the 
navigation power so far as it may interfere with ‘the reasonable use’ of 
the waters for State purposes.”110 This is unlike the Commerce and 
Property Clauses of the U.S. Constitution which, particularly in the arid 
western states, such as California, can be used to prevent the 
impounding of water within a state that affects the navigability, even 
of a non-navigable upper tributary, of a navigable watercourse. In 
 
105 Australian Constitution s 51(i). See also Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 601; 
JOHN QUICK & ROBERT RANDOLPH GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH § 409 (1901). 
106 QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
108 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 601. 
109 Morgan v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 421, 455 (Austl.); Arnold v Minister 
Administering Water Management Act 2000 (2008) NSWCA 338 (Austl.). See also Kildea 
& Williams, supra note 97, at 602. 
110 QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 105, § 416. 
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section 100, the Commonwealth may act to restrain such use only 
where it is unreasonable.111 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, however, the Commonwealth 
Executive has no independent powers, express or implied, with respect 
to water resources. But the High Court of Australia, under section 
75(iii) and (iv) of the Australian Constitution, enjoys original 
jurisdiction with respect to all matters “(iii) in which the 
Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, is a party” and “(iv) between States, or between 
residents of different States, or between a State and a resident of 
another State.” 
As such, the Commonwealth or any state may bring an action against 
another unit of government within the Australian federation with 
respect to water resources. This allows the High Court to deal with any 
issues that might arise as to the interpretation of sections 51(i)–98 and 
100, and in relation to any of the powers that may otherwise be 
construed to apply to water. Throughout the course of federation, some 
states have threatened the use of section 75 to force an interpretation of 
the federal allocation of power over water resources, even going so far 
as to issue a writ; however, no such action has yet reached the High 
Court.112 
As in the United States, the Commonwealth’s powers found in 
sections 51(i)–98 and 100 are paramount,113 and exercisable only by 
the Parliament,114 a position bolstered by the High Court’s centralizing 
interpretation of Commonwealth legislative powers generally in 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (the 
Engineer’s Case). The High Court held that Commonwealth legislative 
powers were to be interpreted in a full and plenary fashion, without 
regard to the impact of that reading on state power.115 This is 
significant, not for its direct impact on the nature of Commonwealth 
power over water, but for what it foreshadowed with respect to that 
power generally, as the historic necessity of the specific express powers 
found in sections 51(i)–98 and 100 faded. Water trade on the River 
 
111 Id. § 409. On the meaning of “reasonable use,” “the waters of rivers,” and 
“irrigation,” see id. §§ 419–421. 
112 CHRIS GUEST, SHARING THE WATER: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF RIVER MURRAY 
POLITICS 15, 89–91, 123 (2016). 
113 See Australian Constitution s 109. 
114 See The Victorian Stevedoring & Gen. Contracting Co. Proprietary Ltd. v Dignan 
(1931) 46 CLR 73, 101 (Dixon, J.) (Austl.). 
115 Amalgamated Soc’y of Eng’rs v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 
(Austl.). 
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Murray was, shortly after federation in 1901, a thing of the past, having 
been replaced by railroads.116 In short order, then, 
[s]ections 98 and 100 were [shown to be] a compromise of the worst 
sort, because they separately responded to the interests of the two 
sides [New South Wales and Victoria on one side and South Australia 
on the other]. The compromise meant that the conflict between 
navigation and the reasonable use of waters for irrigation was in a 
sense enshrined in the Constitution. It was not clear how the 
Commonwealth might exercise its power in relation to navigation, 
without interfering with the ‘reasonable use of water.’ Nor was the 
conflict settled between the states themselves over River Murray 
water. Given the earlier recognition by the states of the need for a 
political resolution, a future High Court . . . was not likely to be 
helpful in resolving conflicts over water.117 
Following the Engineer’s Case, both the Commonwealth and the 
state governments looked anew at the constitutional settlement in the 
hopes that it might provide a solution to an otherwise insoluble 
problem. It did not. True, other express Commonwealth powers appear 
capable of exercise with respect to water, and these powers can be 
divided into two categories: noncoercive and coercive.118 The former 
includes the power to make conditional grants,119 to appropriate money 
for Commonwealth purposes,120 and a Commonwealth request for the 
states to refer their powers to the Commonwealth.121 The latter includes 
the corporations power,122 the external affairs power,123 the trade and 
commerce power,124 the power to acquire property on just terms,125 and 
the implied power to make laws with respect to nationhood.126 In light 
of an expansive post-Engineer’s Case reading, it seemed possible that 
section 100 itself may take on new life.127 With respect to each of these 
powers, the Commonwealth Parliament has the power—as is the case 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution— 
 
116 NOEL GEORGE BUTLIN, INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1861–1900 358–69 (1964). 
117 GUEST, supra note 112, at 15. 
118 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 603–08. 
119 Australian Constitution s 96. 
120 Id. s 81. 
121 Id. s 51(xxxvii). 
122 Id. s 51(xx). 
123 Id. s 51(xxix). 
124 Id. s 51(i). 
125 Id. s 51(xxxi). 
126 See Kate Stoeckel, Introduction, in AUSTRALIAN WATER LAW 5 (Kate Stoeckel et 
al. eds., 2012). 
127 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 602–10. 
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to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to . . . matters incidental to the 
execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament 
or in either House thereof, or in the Government of the 
Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or 
officer of the Commonwealth.128 
Yet, as in the United States, none of these constitutional powers deal 
with water specifically—with the exceptions of sections 98 and 100, 
which envisage the use of water for trade and irrigation. This means 
that each constitutional power, in its post-federation form, would 
require a degree of construction so as to extend its scope to water 
resources. The Australian states were in no better position with respect 
to the constitutional power to deal with water, as we will see in the next 
section. 
b. State Powers 
As in the United States, Commonwealth legislation within its sphere 
of competence enjoys paramountcy over state legislation.129 Still, apart 
from the commerce power and its limitation in relation to the 
reasonable use of waters within the states, and from the potential post-
Engineer’s Case use of Commonwealth noncoercive and coercive 
powers with respect to water, the constitution expressly says nothing 
further about Commonwealth power with respect to water.130 As such, 
by virtue of sections 106–108, the constitution left “the management of 
water resources largely in the hands of the states” as a consequence of 
their plenary legislative power over natural resources.131 Jennifer 
McKay summarizes those powers this way: “the general position is that 
the states have plenary legislative power over management of water 
resources, subject to any restrictions in the Constitution, including any 
inconsistent federal legislation on the matter.”132 The states therefore 
retain power to establish their own body of water resources law with 
respect to the allocation and use of water for land use, agriculture, 
 
128 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxix). 
129 Id. s 109. See also Vince Morabito & Henriette Strain, The Section 109 Cover the 
Field Test of Inconsistency: An Undesirable Legal Fiction, 12 U. TAS. L. REV. 182 (1993). 
130 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 5–6. 
131 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 602. 
132 Jennifer McKay, Water Law in the Australian Federation: The Move Towards 
Centralism 5 (presented at Water Management in Federal and Federal-Type Systems, 
Zaragoza, Spain, July 7–9, 2008), http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/SpainWater2008/ 
Jennifer%20McKay_en_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E33V-29CJ]. 
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forestry, town planning, and floodplains.133 The states have exercised 
and continue to exercise these powers extensively and aggressively 
over the course of federation in an effort to “nationalize” water as part 
of a comprehensive body of law.134 These efforts further the state effort 
to replace the inherited English common law doctrine of riparian rights 
with state control and legislative water use rights.135 
In both the United States and Australia, the federal system splits 
authority over water resources between federal and state governments, 
leaving neither capable alone of dealing with the integrated whole. This 
necessitates cooperative agreements between the federal and state 
governments. We turn now to the principle agreements used in an 
attempt to foster cooperative federalism in the Colorado River and 
Murray-Darling Basins. 
II 
COOPERATIVE OR FLEXIBLE FEDERALISM? 
As a result of the federal division of powers over water, the potential 
for “any unilateral legislative action” by the federal government is 
“necessarily . . . partial.”136 Therefore, “[o]ver the years, a high degree 
of cooperation has evolved between various agencies of the federal 
government and the states in the formulation and administration of 
water plans.”137 This is a fundamental, indeed, necessary adjunct of 
federalism, which is “consistent with any degree of common or co-
operative or parallel action between the unit governments, provided it 
is in a substantial degree voluntary.”138 Cooperation is not limited to  
 
 
133 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 602 (citing Anne Twomey, Aspirational 
Nationalism or Opportunistic Federalism?, QUADRANT 38–39 (2007)). See also QUICK & 
GARRAN, supra note 105, § 409. On the body of State water law, see AUSTRALIAN WATER 
LAW, supra note 44. The latest example of such comprehensive legislation enacted pursuant 
to State constitutional powers over natural resources is South Australia’s Landscape South 
Australia Bill 2019 (SA) (passed House of Assembly, June 4, 2019), which will repeal the 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). See also David Speirs, Landscape South 
Australia Bill Paves Way for Major NRM Reform (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.premier. 
sa.gov.au/news/media-releases/news/landscape-south-australia-bill-paves-way-for-major-
nrm-reform [https://perma.cc/EF3T-3SCU]. 
134 P.N. Davis, Nationalization of Water Use Rights by the Australian States,  
9 U. Queensl. L.J. 1, 2 (1975). 
135 See id. 
136 Kildea & Williams, supra note 97, at 602. 
137 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 337; see also Sandford D. Clark, The Murray-Darling 
Basin: Divided Power, Co-Operative Solutions?, 22 AUSTL. RESOURCES & ENERGY L.J. 
[iv] 322 (2003). 
138 SAWER, supra note 55, at 2. 
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water resources; instead, it happens, and happens frequently in many 
spheres of intergovernmental activity in the American and Australian 
federal systems. In Australia, for instance, “the increase in such [co-
operative] activities . . . since 1928 has been as marked as the increase 
in direct Commonwealth power.”139 
A “Byzantine complexity”140 characterizes the nature of the 
cooperative, flexible, or marble cake federalism with respect to water 
law in California and South Australia—and, indeed, in the water law 
of the whole of Australia and the southwestern United States. It is not 
our objective here to assess the whole of this law.141 Rather, we want, 
first, to provide an overview of a representative example of the nature 
of cooperative federalism drawn from each jurisdiction concerning 
their major water supply rivers—the Colorado and the Murray Rivers 
(watercourses not contained entirely within the relevant state’s 
boundaries). As we will see in the next two sections, a unique body of 
law in each jurisdiction seeks to achieve cooperative federalism for the 
provision of water supply. Having presented these representative 
examples, Part III provides an example of the sort of dispute to which 
this cooperative federalism can give rise—in the case of California, 
over the U.S.-California Central Valley Agreement, and in South 
Australia, over the National Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 
2007 (Cth). 
We argue that both the California and the South Australian efforts at 
cooperative federalism fail, not through a lack of will to cooperate, but 
because they are doomed from the start. Both efforts are founded upon 
federalism, which, no matter the extent of cooperation engendered, 
cannot ever allow for the effective, comprehensive management of the 
entirety of the integrated whole of the water resource. We turn, then, to 
the attempts at cooperative federalism found in California and South 
Australia. 
A. United States-California: “The Law of the River” and the 
Colorado River Compact 
The “Law of the River” represents a primary example of the 
Byzantine complexity that characterizes the cooperative water law 
 
139 Id. 
140 See BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL 
D’ÉTAT (Marina Brilman et al. trans., Polity Press 2009) (2002). 
141 For a full background to the various Australian attempts at interstate water 
management, see Kate Stoeckel & Susanna Lawrence, Water Planning and Management, 
in AUSTRALIAN WATER LAW 31–82 (Kate Stoeckel et al. eds., 2012). 
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flowing from federalism in the southwestern United States.142 It 
comprises the prior-appropriation doctrine143 and 
[t]he treaties, compacts, decrees, statutes, regulations, contracts and 
other legal documents and agreements applicable to the allocation, 
appropriation, development, exportation and management of the 
waters of the Colorado River Basin . . . . There is no single, 
universally agreed upon definition of the Law of the River, but it is 
useful as a shorthand reference to describe this longstanding and 
complex body of legal agreements governing the Colorado River.144 
David Owen provides a more colorful account: 
Grady Gammage, Jr., a lawyer . . . once told an interviewer that, 
when he first became involved in water issues, he felt that every time 
he made a comment about the Colorado another lawyer would inform 
him that whatever he had just suggested was “prohibited by the Law 
of the River.” Gammage had been in practice for some time, but 
didn’t recognize the reference. “So I go to the Arizona Revised 
Statutes book and pull it down, and I look up ‘River, comma, Law 
of,’ and it’s not there.” He did the same with the United States Code, 
also without success. “It turns out that the Law of the River is kind 
of like the British Constitution,” he continued. “It’s whatever the 
people who have really been hanging around it a long time think it 
is.” Invoking it, furthermore, is a privilege reserved for those who 
have undergone what Gammage called “the Water Buffalo 
ceremonial admittance rites.” Water Buffaloes are old-school 
western-water experts: managers, engineers, diverters, legislators, 
and lawyers, almost all of them men, whose long immersion in river-
related discussion, arguments, negotiations, and lawsuits has made 
them deeply suspicious of non-Water Buffaloes and has convinced 
them that wet water [actual flow of the Colorado River] is, in many 
 
142 See IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., supra note 61. For a general, and excellent, history 
of water in the American southwest, see MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE 
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (2nd ed. 1993). 
143 The law that came to replace the English law riparian rights doctrine in the 
southwestern United States; for an overview of this, see Babie, Leadbeter & Nikias, supra 
note 29. 
144 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN 
WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 3, at n.1 (2012) [hereinafter 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER STUDY]. See also Colorado River Basin Water 
Management Case Study, in ASPECTS OF GOVERNING WATER ALLOCATION IN THE U.S. 
76–88 (Maria T. Lantz et al. eds., 2014); IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., supra note 61;  
Greg Hobbs, Jr., History of Colorado River Law, Development and Use: A Primer and Look 
Forward, in HARD TIMES ON THE COLORADO RIVER: DROUGHT, GROWTH AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE COMPACT (Natural Res. L. Ctr., U. Colo. Sch. L. ed., 2005). For a detailed 
chronology of the law of the river, see Law of the River, CENT. ARIZ. PROJECT, 
https://www.cap-az.com/about-us/law-of-the-river [https://perma.cc/T7GR-JCDW] (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
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ways, less significant than paper water [theoretical rights to the 
Colorado River’s flow].145 
This account demonstrates the difficulties involved in managing a 
resource that is an integrated whole when those attempting to do so 
each enjoy a fragmented portion of the necessary power—in other 
words, the difficulty of applying federalism to water resources. For our 
purposes, then, we outline the Law of the River only as it applies to 
California’s water supply. That is enough to demonstrate the 
difficulties created by federalism. The principle components of that 
story involve Los Angeles’ thirst for more water, the Colorado River 
Compact of 1922, and the subsequent Arizona v. California litigation 
in the United States Supreme Court. 
For as long as First Nations peoples gathered to live in the area 
around Los Angeles, the arroyo that came to be known as the Los 
Angeles River supplied the communities’ water needs. The small 
populations there attracted the first European colonizers from Spain in 
1769, who established a pueblo and imposed Spanish water law. 
Europeans were followed by Americans—the California Republic was 
formed in 1848 and entered the Union in 1850—especially those 
moving west to find their fortunes in gold. The Los Angeles River, as 
erratic as the course of its flow was, continued to water the growing 
community, although flash floods would periodically wipe out parts of 
the settlement. The government of the city of Los Angeles, as the 
settlement was called, took increasingly interventionist measures to 
control the location and flow of the watercourse, with the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers ultimately lining the entire length of the channel 
with concrete. It became apparent by the turn of the 19th century, 
though, that the Los Angeles River, even in a good year, would never 
be enough to supply the water demands of the growing city. The town 
fathers, led by William Mulholland, looked north, to the Owens 
Valley.146 
 
145 DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE COLORADO 
RIVER 6, 24 (2017); Law of the River, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU RECLAMATION, 
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html [https://perma.cc/6YJV-F4XX] (last 
updated Mar. 2008) (this source also provides the full text of each of the elements of the 
Law of the River). For a more detailed account, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell, David H. 
Getches & William C. Hugenberg, Jr., The Law of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe 
Sustained Drought, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 825 (1995). 
146 For a timeline of this history, see California Water Timeline, WATER EDUC. FOUND., 
https://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/california-water-timeline [https://perma.cc/ 
FM2Y-WL55] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). For excellent histories, see WILLIAM DEVERELL 
& TOM SITTON, WATER AND LOS ANGELES: A TALE OF THREE RIVERS, 1900–1941 (2017);  
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The Owens River, northeast of Los Angeles, seemed to be the 
answer to Los Angeles’s water supply problems. Led by Mulholland, 
the city of Los Angeles began to buy up the existing water rights of 
landholders in the Owens Valley. Between 1908 and 1913, the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct was constructed, hoisting Owens water over the 
Sierra Nevada, bringing it south to Los Angeles. But demand soon 
outstripped this supply, too. And so, the city cast its eyes further afield. 
But where? California, and especially Southern California, largely 
semiarid and arid, had little additional supply.147 But further east, a 
seemingly wild and untamed river carried with it an entirely untapped 
flow—perhaps this would be the answer to Los Angeles’s water 
prayers. The river? The Colorado.148 
The Colorado River Basin takes in two nations—Mexico and the 
United States—and seven states—Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.149 Putting the international 
dimension to one side, given the federal structure of the United States, 
it goes without saying that no one unit of government, federal or state, 
is capable of dealing with the entirety of the Colorado River. 
Unsurprisingly, this fragmentation of power over the river among so 
many competing demands and priorities has rendered this “iconic yet 
diminished . . . river . . . more an ‘industrial project’ than a natural 
waterway, a river long stripped of its wildness and freedom.”150 
 
Fuller, supra note 43; REISNER, supra note 142; WORSTER, supra note 17; OWEN, supra 
note 145. See also these documentaries: CADILLAC DESERT (PBS Documentary 1992);  
LOS ANGELES: CITY OF THE FUTURE? (BBC Documentary 1997); Water & Power:  
A California Heist, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.natgeotv.com/za/shows/natgeo/ 
water-power-a-california-heist [https://perma.cc/G9H4-JTD7] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); 
Parched, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.natgeotv.com/za/shows/natgeo/parched 
[https://perma.cc/9LXA-LE7G] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
147 ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER 
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA xv (1991). 
148 On this story, see the somewhat historically inaccurate, but nonetheless intriguing 
movie CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974). For a timeline, see California Water 
Timeline, supra note 146. See also DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146; REISNER, supra 
note 142; WORSTER, supra note 17; OWEN, supra note 145; CADILLAC DESERT, supra note 
146; LOS ANGELES: CITY OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 146; Water & Power: A California 
Heist, supra note 146; Parched, supra note 146. 
149 See Diagram 1. 
150 Clark et al., supra note 37, at 793, 818–23. 
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How, then, given the overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions of 
two nations and nine different governmental units, could the flow of 
the Colorado River be harnessed in slaking Los Angeles’s thirst? The 
convergence of the interstate compacts power of the United States 
Congress, coupled with the equitable apportionment original 
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, gave birth to the 
Colorado River Compact of 1922 (the 1922 Compact)151 and the 
ongoing Arizona v. California litigation152 which, to date, has resulted 
in nine Supreme Court orders apportioning the flow of the Colorado 
River among the seven party states.153 The 1922 Compact seemed the 
answer to Los Angeles’s water needs. 
1. Interstate Compacts: Colorado River Compact of 1922 
The 1922 Compact, a treaty among the United States (through the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Bureau of Reclamation) 
(Reclamation)154 and the seven states that fall within the Colorado 
Basin 
[d]ivide[d] the available water [of the Colorado] between an “Upper” 
and “Lower” Basin with the geographic division at Lee Ferry in 
northern Arizona. This agreement . . . allocates 15 million acre-feet 
(“maf”) of annual “exclusive beneficial consumptive use,” 7.5 maf 
each to the Upper and Lower Basins, with an additional maf to the 
Lower Basin. The [1922] Compact also anticipated additional water 
being committed to Mexico and future allocation to the two Basins 
of “surplus” water.155 
The cooperation embodied in the 1922 Compact—to which Arizona 
would not accede until 1944—was an attempt to provide a share of the 
Colorado River water to each of the seven signatory states for 
“agricultural, residential, and industrial use and to compete for the 
hydroelectric power” produced at the largest dam then known to human 
 
151 Colorado River Compact, H.R. Doc. No. 605, 67th Cong., 4th sess., (1923). See also 
DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146. 
152 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); 292 U.S. 341 (1934); 298 U.S. 558 
(1936); 373 U.S. 546 (1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964); 383 U.S. 268 (1966); 439 U.S. 419 
(1979); 460 U.S. 605 (1983); 466 U.S. 144 (1984); 531 U.S. 1 (2000). 
153 For a timeline see California Water Timeline, supra note 146. See also DEVERELL & 
SITTON, supra note 146; Fuller, supra note 43; REISNER, supra note 142; WORSTER, supra 
note 17; OWEN, supra note 145; CADILLAC DESERT, supra note 146; LOS ANGELES: CITY 
OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 146; Water & Power: A California Heist, supra note 146; 
Parched, supra note 146. 
154 See Joe Gelt, Sharing Colorado River Water: History, Public Policy and the 
Colorado River Compact, 10 WATER RESOURCES RES. CTR. (1997). 
155 MacDonnell et al., supra note 145, at 825. 
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history: the Hoover.156 It also contained provisions to meet the federal 
government’s obligations to the “Indian tribes.”157 Soon, though, two 
things became apparent: first, that 1922 had been a particularly wet 
year, which meant that allocations based on what seemed an abundance 
of water could in fact never be satisfied in those years that were 
nowhere near as wet as 1922. There was scarcely enough water to meet 
the state obligations, let alone provide for any surplus.158 Second, with 
respect to an already scarce supply of water, “Los Angeles emerged as 
the leading force in the West to bring the [Hoover Dam] project to 
fruition and obtain much of the water and resulting hydroelectricity for 
itself.”159 
The 1922 Compact is the first of thirteen primary elements that 
together constitute the Law of the River.160 As we noted above, we do 
not propose an exhaustive review of each of those elements. Instead, 
we provide here a brief overview of eleven of the elements other than 
the 1922 Compact, as well as the twelfth, the Arizona v. California 
litigation.161 The other eleven elements of the Law of the River are as 
follows: 
1. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928—ratified the 1922 
Compact, authorized the construction of the Hoover Dam, and 
apportioned flow among the lower basin states of Arizona, 
California, and Nevada.162 
2. California Seven Party Agreement of 1931—helped settle a 
dispute among seven intra-California municipal and agricultural 
interests over California’s share of Colorado River water.163 
3. Mexican Water Treaty of 1944—committed 1.5 maf of the 
Colorado River’s annual flow to Mexico.164 
 
156 DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146, at 58; see also WORSTER, supra note 17; 
STATE OF THE ROCKIES PROJECT 2011–12 RESEARCH TEAM, THE COLORADO RIVER 
BASIN: AN OVERVIEW (2012). 
157 Colorado River Compact, supra note 151, at art. VII. See also STATE OF THE 
ROCKIES PROJECT 2011–12 RESEARCH TEAM, supra note 156. 
158 MacDonnell et al., supra note 145; Stan. Univ. Rural W. Initiative, supra note 42. 
159 DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146, at 58. 
160 See OWEN, supra note 145, at 26; see also Law of the River, supra note 145. 
161 See Law of the River, supra note 145 (summarizing and providing full text of each 
element of the Law of the River). 
162 Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 617 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-
91). 
163 Law of the River, supra note 145. 
164 Treaty between the United States and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of 
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219. 
See also Law of the River, supra note 145. 
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4. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948—created the 
Upper Colorado River Commission and apportioned the Upper 
Basin’s flow among Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming, as well as the part of Arizona that lies within the 
Upper Basin.165 
5. Colorado River Storage Project of 1956—provided a 
comprehensive Upper Basin-wide water resource development 
plan and authorized the construction of a number of dams for 
river regulation and power production.166 
6. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968—authorized a number 
of projects in both the Upper and Lower Basins, including the 
Central Arizona Project (CAP). Most significantly, it made the 
CAP water supply subordinate to California’s apportionment in 
times of shortage.167 
7. Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado 
River Reservoirs of 1970—coordinated the operation of 
reservoirs in the Upper and Lower Basins.168 
8. Minute 242 of the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and 
Water Commission of 1973—required the United States to take 
actions to reduce the salinity of water being delivered to 
Mexico.169 
9. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974—authorized 
desalting and salinity control projects to improve Colorado River 
quality.170 
10. Endangered Species Act of 1973—provided for the conservation 
of endangered and threatened species of fish, wildlife, and plants 
throughout the United States.171 
11. Native American Water Claim Settlements—involved litigated 
and negotiated “settlements . . . between tribes, the federal 
government, states, water districts, and private water users” and 
which, “[a]fter being negotiated, approv[ed] and implement[ed] 
. . . require federal action.”172 In the case of the Colorado River, 
 
165 Law of the River, supra note 145. 
166 Id. 
167 Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1521 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-91). See also Law of the River, supra note 145. 
168 Law of the River, supra note 145. 
169 Id. 
170 Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320 (1974). See also Law 
of the River, supra note 145. 
171 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531–1544. See also Law of the 
River, supra note 145. 
172 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS  
(CRS Report R44148, updated Apr. 16, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44148.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SAF7-EPB4] (this report contains a full list of Native American Water 
Claim Settlements). 
BABIE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:15 PM 
2020] Federalism Fails Water 35  
this federal action is authorized by article VII of the 1922 
Compact.173 
With this background to the Law of the River effected through the 
interstate compacts power in place, we turn now to an assessment of 
the role played in the development of that law through the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction contained in the equitable apportionment 
power. 
2. Equitable Apportionment: Arizona v. California 
The entirety of the Law of the River requires adjudication of disputes 
relating to the allocation of flow effected by the 1922 Compact. As we 
saw in Part I, the Supreme Court may exercise its original jurisdiction 
pursuant to the equitable apportionment power under the Constitution 
as an adjunct to Congress’ interstate compacts power to allocate water 
supply of rivers under federal jurisdiction among states subject to an 
interstate compact. This has allowed the Supreme Court to become 
involved in the allocation of Colorado River water in one of the 
longest-running litigations in the history of the republic. The dispute, 
Arizona v. California, is still ongoing and has to date produced ten 
orders adjusting the allocation of Colorado River water pursuant to the 
1922 Compact in each of the following years: 1931, 1934, 1936, 1963, 
1964, 1966, 1979, 1983, 1984, and 2000.174 The first order specified 
the amount of water to which Arizona was entitled under the 1922 
Compact. Each subsequent order was the outcome of new claims made 
by Arizona that California was using more than its share of water 
pursuant to the 1922 Compact and its application by the Court in the 
earlier orders.175 
The Supreme Court issued the most significant orders affecting the 
Law of the River in 1963, 1964, and 1979.176 In 1963, the Court sought 
to resolve what was then a twenty-five-year-old dispute between 
Arizona and California stemming from Arizona’s desire to build the 
Central Arizona Project, which would allow Arizona to use its full 
water apportionment.177 California objected on the basis that Arizona’s  
 
 
173 Law of the River, supra note 145. 
174 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); 292 U.S. 341 (1934); 298 U.S. 558 
(1936); 373 U.S. 546 (1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964); 383 U.S. 268 (1966); 439 U.S. 419 
(1979); 460 U.S. 605 (1983); 466 U.S. 144 (1984); 531 U.S. 1 (2000). 
175 See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). 
176 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964); 439 U.S. 419 
(1979). 
177 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
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use of water from a Colorado tributary constituted use of its Colorado 
River apportionment and that California had over time acquired a right 
to some of Arizona’s apportionment through the doctrine of prior 
appropriation.178 The Court found that lower basin states have a right 
to appropriate and use Colorado tributary flows and that the doctrine of 
prior appropriation did not apply to apportionments in the lower 
basin.179 In 1964, the Court enjoined the U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
from delivering water outside the framework of apportionments 
defined by the law and mandated the preparation of annual reports 
documenting water use in the lower basin states.180 And in 1979, the 
Court interpreted the meaning of “present perfected rights” pursuant to 
article VIII of the 1922 Compact, which, it held, took priority over later 
contract entitlements established under state law.181 
B. Commonwealth-South Australia: “Water Law” and The Murray-
Darling Basin Plan 
Long before the arrival of Europeans, the Aboriginal peoples of the 
Murray-Darling Basin practiced “active and careful management of 
natural resources,” including management of the river known to the 
Ngarrindjeri people as the Murrurundi, to the Yorta Yorta as the 
Dunghala, and to the Wiradjuri as the Millewa.182 Chris Guest recounts 
that 
[a] landowner near Swan Hill recorded traditional stories of the Wati 
Wati people, which included accounts of food production, soil 
preparation and storage of surplus at harvest time. The use of fish 
traps, dams and fishing techniques was observed throughout the 
Murray-Darling Basin. The construction of permanent dwellings, 
enclosed compounds for containing animals, and seasonal fire 
management of grassland and woodlands for hunting and harvesting 
were all noted.183 
 
178 Id. at 12–13. 
179 Id. at 565–67. 
180 Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 341–46 (1964). 
181 See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979); Law of the River, supra note 145,  
at 33. 
182 GUEST, supra note 112, at 4. See generally BILL GAMMAGE, THE BIGGEST  
ESTATE ON EARTH: HOW ABORIGINES MADE AUSTRALIA (2012). For a map of  
Aboriginal Australia see https://aiatsis.gov.au/explore/articles/aiatsis-map-indigenous-
australia [https://perma.cc/52EP-96AW] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
183 GUEST, supra note 112, at 4 (quoting BRUCE PASCOE, DARK EMU, BLACK SEEDS: 
AGRICULTURE OR ACCIDENT? 36 (2014)). 
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Indeed, not unlike the modern European descendants’ approach to 
land and water use in contemporary United States and Australia, 
Gammage writes that 
[t]he Law—an ecological philosophy enforced by religious 
sanction—compelled people to care for all their country. People lived 
and died to ensure this. The Law prescribed that people leave the 
world as they found it . . . . [A]n uncertain climate and nature’s 
restless cycles demanded myriad practices shaped and varied by local 
conditions. Management was active not passive, alert to season and 
circumstance, committed to a balance of life.184 
And it was not long after the arrival of Europeans on the Australian 
continent before they too came to understand the importance of the 
“Mighty Murray”—an understanding that only grew with each passing 
year of European occupation.185 Former Prime Minister Paul Keating 
explains why: “The Murray-Darling is Australia’s greatest river 
system, a basic source of our wealth, a real and symbolic artery of the 
nation’s economic health, and a place where Australian legends were 
born. Nowhere is the link between the Australian environment, the 
Australian economy and Australian culture better described.”186 As we 
have seen, the “rivers question” came to summarize the importance of 
the Murray-Darling system as the form of power in pre- and post-
federation Australia. This power is both intangible—in its economic, 
political, and social importance—and tangible, because the Basin 
covers fourteen percent of the Australian continent187 and takes in four 
of the federated states (New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, and Victoria) and one Commonwealth territory (the 
Australian Capital Territory).188 
 
184 GAMMAGE, supra note 182, at 2. 
185 GUEST, supra note 112, at 8–10. 
186 Id. at viii (quoting Paul Keating, Statement on the Environment, 21 December 1992, 
Adelaide). 
187 Bill McCormick, Murray-Darling Basin Management, PARLIAMENT AUSTL., 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Lib
rary/pubs/BriefingBook44p/MurryDarlingBasin [https://perma.cc/C2TT-CGWG] (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
188 See infra Diagram 2. 
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Yet, as with the Colorado River, the Australian constitutional 
settlement of power over water left no one unit of government, 
Commonwealth, state, or territory with the power to deal with the 
management and allocation of water in an integrated way over the 
whole of the Murray-Darling Basin. As such, the Commonwealth, 
state, and territory governments have attempted to use cooperative 
federalism to fill the gap.189 The Commonwealth-state efforts to “share 
the water” have demonstrated nothing but the same Byzantine 
complexity exhibited by the allocation of power over water in the 
United States and California.190 
And also not unlike what one finds with respect to the Colorado 
River, the outcome of Australian attempts at cooperative federalism 
over water, and especially over the Murray-Darling Basin, have 
resulted in a contemporary “patchwork of legal fields.”191 This 
patchwork is found in Commonwealth, state, and intergovernmental 
Commonwealth-state law and policy, known collectively in Australia 
as “water law,”192 which consists of: 
• jurisprudence concerning the fundamental nature of the right to 
use water, which is a vital aspect underpinning water resource 
management regimes; 
• resource management frameworks intended to manage 
potentially competing or conflicting uses of limited water 
resources by balancing economic, social and environmental 
needs; 
• legal and regulatory frameworks that allow an individual to use 
and control water resources, subject to compliance with any 
conditions or restrictions imposed in order to achieve the 
objectives of natural resource management frameworks; 
• regimes to permit the dealing or trading in individual water 
rights, reflecting a market-based approach to resource 
management, which facilitates water being able to move to its 
highest value use when it is scarce; 
• economic regulatory frameworks designed to facilitate timely 
and appropriate levels of investment in water and sewerage 
infrastructure, and to ensure continuity of service, as well as to 
protect consumer interests . . . ; 
 
189 See Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 1–10; Clark, supra note 137; Adam Webster, 
Sharing Water from Transboundary Rivers in Australia — An Interstate Common Law?, 39 
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 263 (2015). 
190 This appellation is borrowed from GUEST, supra note 112. 
191 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 1. 
192 Id. 
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• environmental protection laws to protect water quantity by 
facilitating conservation practices . . . and water quality by 
protecting against and penali[z]ing activities that cause 
pollution; and 
• laws and regulations governing the catchment, abstraction and 
distribution of water safely and in sufficient quantities to the 
public for domestic consumption, and the collection, treatment 
and disposal of sewage to acceptable public health and 
environmental standards.193 
As with California, we seek here to provide an overview of one 
example of the cooperative attempts that today form part—indeed, the 
most significant part—of Australian water law: the long and tortuous 
history of the National Water Initiative 2004, the Water Act 2007 (Cth), 
and the Murray-Darling Basin Authority and Plan.194 
As we have seen, the Australian “rivers question” concerned the 
allocation of governmental power over control of the basin’s water 
resources,195 answers to which have been sought since well before 
federation in 1901. Between 1884 and 1887, each of the colonies that 
would later become the states of New South Wales, South Australia, 
and Victoria conducted its own royal commissions into the 
management of the Murray-Darling system, which formed the 
background to the constitutional conventions held between 1891 and 
1898.196 Those conventions would ultimately adopt the text of the 
constitution as it was enacted in 1901. The 1895–1902 “federation 
drought” spurred the same states to hold a joint government-industry 
conference, resulting in another royal commission. This eventually 
resulted in the River Murray Waters Agreement of 1914, which set out 
the respective states’ shares of water, and established the River Murray 
Commission for the regulation and management of the river. The River 
Murray Commission operated for seventy years before it was replaced 
in 1987 with the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council and the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC). This expanded the scope 
of the original 1914 agreement, replaced by the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement 1987, to the whole of the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
193 Id. at 1–10. 
194 For the history of those efforts, see generally GUEST, supra note 112; Stoeckel, supra 
note 126. 
195 See supra Section I.B.2. 
196 For a good overview of the history of the water dispute in Australia, see generally 
BRET WALKER, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 79–99 (2019) 
[hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]. 
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(Queensland became a party to the agreement in 1992, and the 
Australian Capital Territory in 1998).197 
In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) (itself an 
effort at intergovernmental cooperation) established a water reform 
agenda, and between 1999 and 2005 it sought to include issues related 
to national water management within a national competition policy. In 
2003, seeking a refresh of the 1994 agenda so as “to increase the 
productivity and efficiency of water use, sustain rural and urban 
communities, and ensure the health of river and groundwater systems,” 
COAG implemented the National Water Initiative (NWI) of 2004, an 
intergovernmental agreement establishing a framework for national 
water reforms.198 Every state and territory was to enact a legislative 
regime consistent with the NWI, so as to provide for certainty on which 
to base decisions about Australian water management, optimizing 
economic, social, and environmental outcomes.199 
In 2007, in an effort to move forward with the objectives set by the 
NWI, the Commonwealth government, relying upon its limited heads 
of constitutional power and a referral of state powers,200 enacted the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth).201 The underlying rationale for this legislation 
was to return Murray-Darling water extraction levels to sustainable 
levels, allowing for the protection of and return to environmental health 
and balancing that against continued productive growth.202 To meet 
these objectives, the Act established the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority (MDBA) as a successor to the MDBC, which, coming into 
existence in 2008, became the first single agency with responsibility 
over water resource planning across the entire basin.203 The principle 
objectives of the MDBA were to prepare a strategic long-term basin 
plan setting sustainable and capped diversion limits and to develop 
water quality and salinity targets as well as an environmental watering 
 
197 GUEST, supra note 112, at vi–vii; see also ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
196, at 237 (providing a full chronology of the Agreements dealing with the Murray-Darling 
over the course of Australian Federation). 
198 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 8; GUEST, supra note 112, at 184–85. 
199 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 8–9. 
200 Each of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland enacted a 
Water (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2008. 
201 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 10. For a detailed account of the background to and 
enactment of the Water Act 2007 (Cth), see GUEST, supra note 112, at 196–221. 
202 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 113–18. 
203 Water Act 2007 (Cth) ss 172–173; Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 6; GUEST, supra note 
112, at vi–vii. 
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plan. The Murray-Darling Basin Plan (MDBP), the result of four years 
of intergovernmental negotiation, became law in 2012.204 
The subtitle to this part of the Article is in the form of an 
interrogatory, by which we mean to ask whether cooperation through 
federalism really can be achieved between units of government holding 
fragments of power over water resources in California and South 
Australia. Notwithstanding what might seem to be successful 
cooperation in the law surrounding the 1922 Compact and the MDBP, 
the answer to that question is a resounding no, as we now show. 
III 
DISPUTES WITHIN THE COOPERATIVE USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OVER WATER 
As long ago as 1950, the U.S. President’s Water Resources Policy 
Commission identified problems with the federal arrangement of 
powers over water, writing that “complete Federal assumption of 
responsibility” for the development of the nation’s water resources 
“would destroy the effectiveness of the government of the States and 
work a profound and undesirable change in our traditional plan of 
government.”205 And the Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government recommended that responsibility 
for water resources “should be discharged by state or local 
governments . . . or by private enterprise.”206 
The problem, which should already be obvious, is that a river,  
and water generally, “may come under both federal and state 
jurisdiction during the course of its flow and be subject to various types 
of appropriation, all of which calls for programs involving a high 
degree of coordinated planning and operation.”207 As a solution, 
writing in 1957, Engelbert suggested strengthening the role of the 
states, in any one or a combination of six ways: administrative 
reorganization, policy formulation and planning, state review of federal 
programs, joint federal-state financing, joint federal-state management,  
 
 
204 See Basin Plan 2012, made under subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the Water Act 2007 
(Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2018C00451 [https://perma.cc/B7WQ-
6LSY]. See also Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 10. For a detailed account of the background 
to and adoption of the MDBP, see GUEST, supra note 112, at 215–20. 
205 PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 62, at 2–3. 
206 U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON WATER RESOURCES AND POWER 36 (1955). 
207 Engelbert, supra note 64, at 325, 344. 
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or intergovernmental administrative arrangements.208 In 1960, Sho 
Sato explored demands for legislative intervention, either federal or 
state.209 The point both Engelbert and Sato make is simply this: 
federalism is a poor means of allocating power over a resource like 
water. 
Australia’s water history reveals no greater success in making use of 
cooperative federalism. The process of federation in the late 1890s 
itself stumbled over the “rivers question.”210 During the federal 
movement in the late 19th century, South Australia’s delegates to the 
constitutional conventions pushed for the new federation to be 
bestowed with the power to regulate the river, being concerned that 
leaving the river to the states would lead to inequity and the inability 
of the states to compromise.211 The eastern states—Victoria and New 
South Wales—refused; being richer, they were unwilling to give up 
their stake in the river system to appease South Australia (particularly 
New South Wales, which was eager to keep control of the Darling, 
located largely within its boundaries).212 Over one hundred years later, 
the South Australian Murray-Darling Royal Commission, which 
delivered its report on January 29, 2019, emphasized that the struggle 
of the late nineteenth century remains that of the early twenty-first 
century. The struggle is one of federal versus state interests: “South 
Australia had failed to achieve the desirable national character of the 
Basin’s regulation as a topic for the national legislature; Victoria and 
New South Wales had succeeded in placing their local interests ahead 
of a national significance of the Basin.”213 In short, what was once 
thought the virtue of federalism (a fragmentation of power so as to 
prevent its concentration in one place held by a few hands) is in fact its 
vice—fragmenting control over what cannot be fragmented: the 
integrated whole of water resources. Water does not conform to the 
arbitrary boundaries set by federalism, nor does it abide by the 
allocation of public power to allocate use rights between the federal 
and state governments. 
Our review of cooperation ought not to deceive us, for the examples 
of failure to cooperate are too numerous to fully recount here. For that 
reason, as with our review of cooperation, we have chosen but one 
 
208 Id. at 344–50. 
209 See generally Sato, supra note 68. 
210 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 102. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 102–03. 
213 Id. at 103; cf. id. at 112. 
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example of a dispute drawn from each of California and South 
Australia: in the case of the former, the dispute surrounding the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation–California Department of Water 
Resources Coordinated Operation Agreement 1986, which came to a 
head in 2018 and 2019; in the case of the latter, the disputes that 
resulted from the implementation of the National Water Initiative 2004 
(NWI) and the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and culminated with the 
Australian Productivity Commission Report of 2018 and South 
Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission of 2019. Having 
looked at those examples, we turn to an assessment of the significant 
challenges that already, or will, face the allocation of water in 
California and South Australia and with which federalism, either on its 
own or through its cooperative use, will almost certainly be unable to 
cope. 
A. United States Bureau of Reclamation–California Department of 
Water Resources Coordinated Operation Agreement 1986 
The California State Water Project (SWP) is a water storage and 
delivery system planned, constructed, and operated by the California 
Department of Water Resources (DWR).214 It delivers nearly 4.2 maf 
per year through water supply contractors, with the SWP supplying 
water to more than 27 million people in Northern California and 
irrigating about 750,000 acres of farmland, mainly in the San Joaquin 
Valley.215 The overarching purpose of the SWP is to balance the needs 
of water delivery and environmental protection. It does this through 
ensuring four primary benefits: flood control, power generation, 
recreation, and the preservation of fish and wildlife habitat. 
To achieve its environmental objectives, the SWP was designed to 
work in cooperation with Reclamation’s Central Valley Project 
(CVP).216 The CVP, a federal water project owned and operated by 
Reclamation, covers about 400 miles in California and draws from two 
large river basins: the Sacramento and the San Joaquin.217 Comprising 
extensive water storage and conveyance infrastructure, the CVP 
delivers more than seven maf of water to users who have contracts with 
 
214 See generally Dennis Silverman, California Water Projects Feeding Southern 
California, ENERGY BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), https://sites.uci.edu/energyobserver/2015/04/ 
28/california-water-projects-feeding-southern-california/ [https://perma.cc/CGC5-3764]. 
215 State Water Project, CAL. DEP’T WATER RESOURCES, https://water.ca.gov/ 
Programs/State-Water-Project [https://perma.cc/EQ9X-JX3N] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
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Reclamation to support irrigated agriculture, municipalities, and fish 
and wildlife needs in California. About seventy-five percent of CVP 
water is used for agricultural irrigation, including seven of California’s 
top ten agricultural counties. Contractors receive varying levels of 
priority for water deliveries based on several factors, including 
hydrology, water rights, prior agreements with Reclamation, and 
regulatory requirements.218 
Because both the SWP and the CVP predated major federal natural 
resources and environmental protection laws, and in order to coordinate 
activities between the federal and state governments, in 1986 the DWR 
and Reclamation signed the Coordinated Operation Agreement 
(COA)219 to define how the two water projects would meet water 
quality and environmental flow obligations. While the COA called for 
periodic review to provide updates in response to changed conditions, 
no such reviews took place during the first thirty-two years of 
operation. By 2018, this failure had become a significant 
intergovernmental conflict between the DWR and Reclamation, 
reaching to the very highest level of government—President Trump 
threatened to sue California over control of the water to avoid full 
environmental review of new projects as required by the COA.220 As 
such, after completing a joint review process between 2016 and 2018, 
in December 2018 the DWR and Reclamation concluded agreements 
amending and adding to the COA,221 so as to (1) establish water quality 
 
218 CHARLES V. STERN & PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., R45342, 
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT: ISSUES AND LEGISLATION (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R45342.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVF7-KGA3]. See also Lawrence B. Lee, California 
Water Politics: Opposition to the CVP, 1944–1980, 54 AGRIC. HIST. 402 (1980); Zachary 
P. Sugg, An Equity Autopsy: Exploring the Role of Water Rights in Water Allocations and 
Impacts for the Central Valley Project during the 2012–2016 California Drought,  
7 RESOURCES 12 (2018). 
219 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR COORDINATED OPERATION OF 
THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE STATE WATER PROJECT (1986), https://www. 
waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/exhi
bits/docs/petitioners_exhibit/glenn/gcid_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7X3-RPZX]. 
220 See California Water Wars Would Get Crazy Complicated if Trump Administration 
Dives In, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 31, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/ 
editorials/article217621920.html [https://perma.cc/5RDA-HUXY]; Water in California, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/11/17/water-
in-california [https://perma.cc/AJP3-49JT]; Karla Nemeth, What New Water Deals Mean 
and What Work Is Left to Be Done, MODESTO BEE (Jan. 2, 2019, 12:39 PM), https://www. 
modbee.com/opinion/article223834720.html [https://perma.cc/K6V3-PLD6]. 
221 Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of Water 
Resources, Agreement Between U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of  
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regulations and tighten environmental restrictions; (2) formalize the 
cost-sharing formula for projects designed to meet joint responsibilities 
under the Endangered Species Act; and (3) move forward with a 
Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta conveyance project, known as 
California WaterFix, with Reclamation and CWP Project contractors 
determining how to account for and allocate the benefits and costs of 
WaterFix if the project went forward (this objective has since been 
abandoned222).223 
While the 2018 resolution was an admirable and much-needed de-
escalation of what had become a protracted and heated inability to 
cooperate, in a press release announcing the outcome, the parties wrote, 
“Today the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the California 
Department of Water Resources announced a series of agreements to 
resolve water conflicts that have vexed the State for decades.”224 While 
“reaffirm[ing] the collaborative partnership between the Federal and 
State governments to develop long-term solutions to California’s major 
water problems,”225 this can hardly be considered a successful means 
of managing a complex and integrated resource. Instead, it is merely a 
stopgap solution which attempts to work within a flawed, fragmented 
system for managing that resource. 
B. National Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 2007 (Cth) 
The complicated history culminating in the adoption of the NWI in 
2004 and the Water Act 2007 (Cth), the establishment of the MDBA, 
and the implementation and management of the MDBP, demonstrates 
the controversial nature of basin regulation since well before the 
Federation of Australia. Money and politics constantly played a role in 
this process, threatening to end cooperation at every stage.226 The 
interests of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria, the upper 
river states, have often been pitted against those of the lower river state, 
 
Water Resources Supported by Public Water Agencies (Dec. 12, 2018), https://wwd.ca.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/12/VA-Joint-Contractor-Press-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3U82-9S7D]. 
222 The California WaterFix Project, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNS. (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.nrdc.org/court-battles/waterfix [https://perma.cc/4UNC-E3SU]. 
223 State Water Project, supra note 215. 
224 Press Release, U.S Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of Water 
Resources, supra note 221. 
225 Id. 
226 GUEST, supra note 112, at 221. 
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South Australia, and, just as often, against each other.227 While South 
Australia was an early proponent of a coordinated effort to manage the 
rivers, in constitutional terms this meant referring the power to regulate 
the water to the Commonwealth, on the assumption that coordination 
was the only way to resolve the problem of the overuse of water in the 
upper river, where agriculture was firmly established. If the lower river 
was to be allowed to flow at a sustainable level and to provide water 
for production at the lower end, it would require agreement and 
coordinated regulation. The pursuit of self-interest by the states, 
however, has been a constant obstacle that the federal system has been 
unable to navigate. 
In the way that a problem identified early, and neglected, becomes a 
major crisis in time, the current position of the Murray-Darling system 
is the child of this struggle predating the birth of Australian federation. 
As we have seen, the century of negotiation and renegotiation between 
the Commonwealth and the states228 resulted in the enactment of the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the establishment of the MDBA as the body 
responsible for attempting an integrated management of the basin 
through the development of the MDBP.229 Yet failure to cooperate even 
in the context of supposed cooperation resulted in conflict, as identified 
by two recent reports concerning the Murray-Darling system. In late 
2018, the Australian Productivity Commission issued a damning 
assessment of the legal framework upon which the Murray-Darling’s 
management is based,230 while in early 2019 the South Australian 
Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission produced a report that, while 
seemingly complimentary about the nature of cooperative federalism 
in basin management, nonetheless found significant difficulties with 
the operation of that regime.231 Both diagnosed the problem as one of 
unclear and impractical division of powers among the various 
stakeholder bodies in the management of the Murray-Darling Basin. 
Finding “serious deficiencies in the areas of role clarity [and] 
conflicting functions” between the various responsible bodies,232 the 
Productivity Commission concluded that whereas the MDBA was 
 
227 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 13–14; JANE DOOLAN & JOHN 
MADDEN, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, MURRAY-DARLING 
BASIN PLAN: FIVE-YEAR ASSESSMENT, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT 
(2018) [hereinafter PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT]. 
228 See generally ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 102–17. 
229 Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
230 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 227. 
231 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 117. 
232 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 227, at 356. 
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supposed to drive the implementation of a sustainable plan for the river, 
the states were ultimately the responsible mechanisms for the necessary 
changes.233 In other words, the locus of duty fails to coincide with the 
locus of power. And not only is the MDBA unequipped to implement 
the plan but also its mandate is riddled with conflicts. The Productivity 
Commission concluded skeptically: the MDBA is simultaneously 
tasked to assist the states in the implementation of the plan (however 
impotently) and to monitor and report that progress. As one submission 
to the Productivity Commission put it, the authority “marks its own 
homework.”234 
In early 2019, the South Australian Royal Commission identified the 
problem with management of the Murray-Darling as the practice and 
execution of the system rather than in its design. While judging the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) “an excellent example of the progress that 
co-operative Federalism in the Australian context can achieve” and a 
“symphony of co-operative Federalism,” the problem was not the 
structure of the system itself, but the fact that the system could not 
achieve its purpose because it was “drowned out” by “a cacophony of 
short-sighted, vested self-interests.”235 The Royal Commission found 
that the system governing the rivers was not being correctly honored 
by the parties responsible for its operation—the states.236 Some states, 
New South Wales and Victoria in particular, have sought quite recently 
to “withdraw” from the agreement governing the rivers.237 This is 
driven by a distaste among these larger states to share control over the 
resource with South Australia, since sharing control would necessarily 
diminish their dominant position as the larger economies and as states 
at the upper end of the river. The aim of cooperative federalism was let 
down by uncooperative state parties.238 This, the Royal Commission 
has characterized as an “impediment” to achieving the objectives of the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and its associated plan for the rivers.239 And this 
creates significantly negative consequences for stakeholders, who are 
frustrated by the opacity of the MDBA and their inability to obtain 
information from it.240 
 
233 Id. at 349. 
234 Id. at 351. 
235 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 117. 
236 Id. at 49 and 112–13. 
237 Id. at 112–13. 
238 Id. at 49. 
239 Id. 
240 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 227, at 353. 
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Yet, while the South Australian Royal Commission shared the alarm 
of the Productivity Commission in relation to the current state of 
management, its diagnosis differed: oddly, it concluded that the system 
must be preserved and restored to pursue its proper purpose.241 The 
Royal Commission considered agents, who shared competing and 
unwilling interests, to have failed efforts at cooperative federalism.242 
The Productivity Commission, however, went further, concluding that 
the system itself was flawed.243 To the extent that the Royal 
Commission recognized the systemic problem, the commissioner 
appeared to be resigned to the fact that it was an inevitable consequence 
of the constitutional order: 
Because of our Federal constitutional distribution of legislative 
powers, for better or for worse we have set out to render the project 
of rehabilitating the Basin’s water resources enforceable and thereby 
effective, by a combination of intergovernmental agreements, 
Commonwealth external affairs powers and the tightly controlled 
referral of State powers to the Commonwealth — along with a welter 
of standing arrangements for inter-jurisdictional liaison and decision-
making. In the absence of utterly unrealistic change to our 
Commonwealth Constitution by referendum, this very Australian 
framework of governance will remain, faute de mieux. The cheerful 
term for it is ‘co-operative federalism’. A grimmer view would see it 
as a cockpit for interstate rivalrous self-interests.244 
And the Productivity Commission was clearer, calling for structural 
changes: 
In the absence of structural reform, in 2024 the MDBA will be 
responsible for deciding to reconcile the effectiveness of supply 
measures in achieving equivalent environmental outcomes . . . . 
Given the MDBA’s role advising governments on water resource 
management and the water market, and as operator of the River 
Murray, over the longer term it will be a judge of its own performance 
in this regard. 
If Basin Governments do not commit to and progress structural 
reform, the credibility of the MDBA (as both regulator and agent of 
governments) will be extremely compromised, and the likelihood of 
successful implementation significantly diminished . . . . Structural 
separation should begin as soon as possible, and should be completed 
by 2021.245 
 
241 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 117–18. 
242 Id. at 49. 
243 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 227, at 358. 
244 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 38. 
245 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 227, at 364. 
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As is the case with the federal-state cooperation in California and 
the Colorado Basin, it is not hard to see that there is a fundamental 
structural problem in the constitutional arrangement for water 
regulation in the Murray-Darling Basin. The solution, in the form of 
the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the establishment of a national body, the 
MDBA, stumbled on the very obstacles it sought to clear. As the 
Productivity Commission makes abundantly clear, the primary cause 
of failure has been a responsible body riddled with conflict. Charged 
with the implementation and regulation of the MDBP, the MDBA 
became the marker of its own homework.246 With bitter irony, the 
Productivity Commission concluded that the MDBA, instead of 
providing a solution to state self-interest, has become focused on the 
pursuit of its own self-interests.247 
An admirable goal, the experiences in both California and South 
Australia illustrate how cooperative federalism remains an unlikely 
source of comprehensive and lasting solutions when pursued by a 
federal government and states acting primarily—and by their very 
nature—through self-interest. Two comments, both made by South 
Australian politicians, neatly summarize the fragility of cooperative 
federalism. In one, the legislator, commenting on whether upstream 
state politicians in New South Wales and Victoria would support a 
project with benefits only for South Australia, suggested that to do so 
would “forget all about the cost to their own taxpayers [who], out of 
the goodness of their heart, do something for the benefit of South 
Australia. I think that is asking a little too much of anyone’s rational 
intelligence.”248 In the second, almost forty years later, another 
legislator said that 
[e]very state bats for itself. Politics ensures that they do that. You can 
imagine what would happen if they did not . . . . [A]ny of us who 
attends a national forum and is asked to vote on a water issue will 
vote for South Australia every time, otherwise we will not stay in this 
place.249 
The failure of cooperative federalism follows the incompatibility of 
federal and state interests. This sad reality has been demonstrated for 
 
246 Id. at 351; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 74, 698. 
247 See Cash Splash, ABC FOUR CORNERS (July 8, 2019, 8:31 PM), https://www. 
abc.net.au/4corners/cash-splash/11289412 [https://perma.cc/RDR3-NJVY] (describing the 
dispute, which continues, unabated, to rage). 
248 GUEST, supra note 112, at ix (quoting South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Assembly, 24 Aug. 1971, 1,019). 
249 Id. at ix (quoting South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 14 
Oct. 2008, 369–71). 
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over a century, both in Australia and in the southwestern United States, 
and is unlikely to change in the face of those challenges which already 
exist, and which are emerging in both jurisdictions. 
IV 
EXISTING AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 
We could have chosen any number of contemporary challenges 
facing water management in California and South Australia to illustrate 
our thesis.250 Here, though, we outline only four, which seem most 
acute today and for which federalism seems most unable to provide  
a solution: (1) overallocation and environmental or ecological flows  
of water; (2) First Nations/Indigenous cultural flows of water; (3) 
international obligations concerning water; and (4) the consequences 
of climate change. 
A. Overallocation and Overuse 
Water, already in scarce supply in both California and South 
Australia,251 is both overallocated and overused. The Water Act 2007 
(Cth) provides that 
there is an overallocation . . . if, with full development of water 
access rights in relation to the water resources of the area, the total 
volume of water able to be extracted by the holders of water access 
rights at a given time exceeds the environmentally sustainable level 
of take for those water resources [and that] there is an overuse . . . if 
the total volume of water actually taken for consumptive use from the 
water resources of the area at a given time exceeds the 
environmentally sustainable level of take for those water 
resources.252 
As we have seen, the states in both countries hold more significant 
power to establish water resources law so as to allocate private power 
 
250 See, e.g., Brendan Boepple, The Colorado River Basin: An Overview by the State of 
the Rockies Project 2011–12 Research Team, in THE 2012 COLORADO COLLEGE STATE OF 
THE ROCKIES REPORT CARD: THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN: AGENDA FOR USE, 
RESTORATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 24 (2012); CADILLAC 
DESERT, supra note 146; LOS ANGELES: CITY OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 146; Water & 
Power: A California Heist, supra note 146; Parched, supra note 146. 
251 See OWEN, supra note 145, at 230–31 (describing levels of extreme drought in the 
Colorado system); Matt Coughlan, Murray Darling Basin Drought Officially Worst on 
Record, INDAILY (July 19, 2019), https://indaily.com.au/news/national/2019/07/19/murray-
darling-basin-drought-officially-worst-on-record/ [https://perma.cc/3UAQ-W2CY] 
(describing levels of extreme drought in the Murray-Darling system). 
252 See Water Act 2007 (Cth) § 4. 
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over water—proprietary interests to private holders with respect to 
water use. 
Both California253 and South Australia254—as is the case with every 
state in both countries—have established vast, complex systems of 
water resources law and proprietary entitlements in water. Those 
systems typically establish a system of prioritizing the allocation of 
water among the various types of proprietary interests in water 
rights.255 The water resources law of California, for instance, 
establishes a complex system of priority rules for allocating water 
supply.256 In Australia, while “all licensed [South Australian] users 
have high security water rights . . . . NSW, Victoria and Queensland 
. . . prioriti[z]e the distribution of water between high and low security 
rights.”257 And forced to choose in a competition of interests for the 
right to use water, the states tend aggressively to pursue economic 
objectives, often at the expense of the riparian ecosystem. As such, in 
both countries it is the states that are primarily responsible for the 
overallocation and overuse of the scarce resource. 
Indeed, conflicts over consumptive allocation have reached crisis 
point. In both the Colorado and the Murray-Darling Basins, water use 
is already both overallocated and overused in terms of total resource 
needs.258 In the Colorado Basin, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
predicts that by 2060, the median expected annual water deficit will be 
more than three maf.259 Looking ahead, “[e]ven the best case is lousy, 
and the worst case—minimum supply, maximum consumption—
almost doesn’t bear thinking about. If everyone used all the water they 
have a legal right to use, there would be much less than no water  
 
 
253 See SLATER 2, supra note 44. 
254 See Stoeckel, Webb & Green, supra note 44, at 83–220; Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA) (Austl.). 
255 See, e.g., STATE OF THE ROCKIES PROJECT 2011–12 RESEARCH TEAM, supra note 
156. 
256 SLATER 1, supra note 65, § 3.15; SLATER 2, supra note 44, § 13.14. 
257 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, WATER RIGHTS ARRANGEMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND 
OVERSEAS: ANNEX E SOUTH AUSTRALIA 44 (2003). For an example of the priority rules 
that exist in New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland, see Michael Mckenzie, Water 
Rights in NSW: Properly Property?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 443 (2009). 
258 COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER STUDY, supra note 144, at 4, n.5. These needs 
include “water allocations and deliveries for municipal, industrial, and agricultural use; 
hydroelectric power generation; recreation; fish, wildlife, and their habitats . . . ; water 
quality including salinity; flow- and water-dependent ecological systems; and flood 
control.” Id. See also Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 6. 
259 COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER STUDY, supra note 144, at 9. 
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left.”260 It has long been known that the deficit between natural flow 
and allocated water use is a significant problem in the Murray-Darling 
Basin.261 Disputes over allocation can lead to significant conflict, as 
demonstrated by the dispute concerning the COA in California and a 
recent $750 million class action suit brought by Murray-Darling 
irrigators for damages caused by loss of water pursuant to an 
allocation.262 
In all of this consumptive use, two matters tend to go unnoticed: the 
protection of the environment and the nexus between water use and 
land use planning and management. Given the nature of federalism in 
a system strained and stretched by overallocation and overuse, in which 
at least one of the governmental actors responsible for addressing that 
use tends to side with economic rather than environmental outcomes, 
two related questions arise: (1) is it possible to protect a volume of 
water that is left “in-stream” to sustain the ecological health of the 
watercourse,263 and (2) how can the nexus of land use and water supply 
be dealt with in a coordinated way? We briefly consider each of these 
questions. 
1. Ecological Flows 
Obviously, in addition to conflict over consumptive uses, there is 
another set of conflicts between competing objectives: the first is that 
between “instream use[s]” and traditional extractive consumptive uses; 
the second is between “instream values” and “efficiency.”264 In 
American law, instream uses or values are typically protected by some 
form of instream flow rights. In Australian law, instream values are 
protected by environmental water. An instream flow right or 
environmental water 
is like a water right that belongs to the river itself . . . . The idea is to 
treat fish, other stream-dependent animals, and functioning wetlands 
as “beneficial uses,” by assigning to some of the water they depend 
 
260 OWEN, supra note 145, at 228. 
261 DEP’T OF WATER RES. VICTORIA, WATER LAW REVIEW, REPORT NO. 1 AT 20 
(1986); GUEST, supra note 112, at 26–35, 206–07. 
262 Kerry Brewster, Murray-Darling Irrigators File Class Action Seeking $750m from 
Basin Authority, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
australia-news/2019/may/14/murray-darling-irrigators-file-class-action-seeking-750m-
from-basin-authority [https://perma.cc/2QVH-Z2ME]. 
263 See Boepple, supra note 250. 
264 See generally GOTTLIEB, supra note 3. 
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on its own place in a river’s priority list. [They are] limited in scope 
[and typically, although not always] have very junior priority . . . .265 
Similarly, Australian law distinguishes two types of environmental 
water, which 
may be water intentionally left in a river for the environment, or water 
that is remaining after consumptive needs have been met (often 
referred to as rules-based environmental water), or water that is 
released (generally from dams) into the river to achieve 
environmental outcomes (entitlement-based environmental water). 
Often, rules-based environmental water is achieved through limiting 
the number, volume and timing of extractions from a river; and 
entitlement-based environmental water tends to occur in regulated 
systems where a large, public in-stream dam captures the majority of 
the river flow and water is specifically set aside for the environment. 
For this reason, both diversion or extraction limits, as well as the 
provision of environmental water, are critical in achieving 
environmental objectives. Similarly, all water planning has 
ramifications for the environment because the permitted resource use 
for consumptive purposes under those plans directly affects the 
amount of water remaining for the environment.266 
Put another way, while instream flow or environmental water rights 
typically lose out to higher value consumptive priorities in a given 
watercourse, “their existence, even as theoretical constructs, 
beneficially enlarges the legal conception of what a river is for.”267 
Here we refer to the American instream flow right and the Australian 
environmental water right as “ecological flows.” 
Ecological flows are but one element of the larger issues of 
allocating and using an already overallocated and overused resource, 
according to some wider set of priorities. These priorities exist between 
individual holders of proprietary interests in water, and among 
competing types of use for that water, either consumptive or instream. 
But as with allocation generally, the same question arises: which 
governmental level can deal with managing the complexities of 
allocation in an integrated way? Or put another way, which government 
is charged with ensuring the environmental health of interstate rivers 
like the Colorado and the Murray-Darling system? The answer, of 
course, is far from clear; again, the federal fragmentation of control 
over water plays its perverse, tyrannical role. 
 
265 OWEN, supra note 145. 
266 Amy Hankinson, Environmental Water and Protection, in AUSTRALIAN WATER 
LAW 479–80 (Kate Stoeckel et al. eds., 2012). 
267 OWEN, supra note 145, at 92. See also Huffaker et al., supra note 66. 
BABIE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:15 PM 
2020] Federalism Fails Water 55  
The power of the United States to deal with ecological flows seems 
limited to those powers which it has to deal with water generally, 
particularly the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8. Congress has 
relied upon this power to enact every piece of environmental legislation 
since 1970,268 including the Endangered Species Act, and the 
centerpiece of that action—the delegation of power to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to protect air in the Clean Air Act269 
and water in the Clean Water Act.270 The same is true in Australia—the 
Commonwealth power to deal with environmental water and, indeed, 
with environmental protection itself, is limited to those powers that deal 
with water generally, as outlined in Part I, and especially the powers 
over external affairs, corporations, and just terms acquisition of 
property.271 Yet, notwithstanding these federal powers, the 
environment often loses because state consumptive objectives often 
stifle federal power. 
Paradoxically, while the states have greater power with respect to 
water, and thus with respect to the environmental health of water, the 
federal fragmentation of power often proves difficult to reconcile with 
the integrated unity of fragile riparian ecosystems.272 Nonetheless, state 
power can be used to establish ecological flows. In California, for 
instance, ecological flows are established by two closely related 
doctrines: the public trust doctrine and the instream flow right. The 
former ensures that “instream values,” along with the state’s interests 
in recreation and navigation, are provided a continuing basis for 
protection.273 The public trust doctrine is defined with reference to 
federal and state “sovereign ownership of navigable waters, tidelands, 
and submerged lands of navigable waters.”274 The trust consists of two 
interrelated principles: 
 
 
 
268 See Heddy Bolster, The Commerce Clause Meets Environmental Protection:  
The Compensatory Tax Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide 
Regulation, 47 B.C. L. REV. 737 (2006); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce 
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Hoover, supra note 15. 
269 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-93). 
270 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–500, 86 
Stat. 816. 
271 See Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.). See generally James 
Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 11 (1991). 
272 See WORSTER, supra note 17, at 290–95. 
273 SLATER 1, supra note 65, § 1.06. 
274 SLATER 2, supra note 44, § 13.01(1) (footnotes omitted). See also id. §§ 13.01(2)–
13.02 (providing historical and legal background). 
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The people of the state have a common right to the use of natural 
resources and the ownership of these natural resources lies with the 
sovereign, or the state. State sovereign ownership includes the 
public’s inviolable rights to certain natural resources which are held 
in trust by the state, to regulate and control the trust resources for the 
protection and preservation of trust uses on behalf of the beneficiaries 
of the trust, the people of California.275 
The public trust doctrine—first applied to California’s consumptive 
water use by the California Supreme Court in National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court276—comprises trust resources and trust uses. 
Trust resources include tidelands, submerged lands, and navigable and 
non-navigable waters, while trust uses “traditionally are limited to the 
triad of commerce, navigation, and fisheries. Over time, the umbrella 
of trust uses has expanded to include recreational uses, including the 
right to hunt, swim, and fish.”277 As with any trust, the state as trustee 
holds the proprietary interest in such resources and the people of 
California hold the beneficial interest, with the former unable to 
alienate its interest.278 
In addition to the public trust and instream flow rights, state law can 
also protect a third category of environmental interest, known as 
“instream values,” which, as 
a matter of state policy . . . ha[ve] been incorporated into the water 
rights system. The principal vehicle to protect instream uses under 
the traditional regulatory system is the [California State Water 
Resources Control Board (SWRCB)]’s administration of 
appropriative water rights . . . . The Legislature has adopted statutory 
standards which the SWRCB and the Department of Fish and Game 
must consider to protect and preserve instream uses when allocating 
the state’s water resources. In general, the issuance of appropriative 
water rights permits requires consideration of the public interest in 
instream uses before granting an application to appropriate.279 
The appropriation process therefore “mandates the balancing of 
instream and consumptive uses” with instream uses “accorded equal 
value to offstream uses.”280 A detailed framework of priority rules  
 
 
275 Id. § 13.01(1) (footnotes omitted). 
276 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
277 SLATER 2, supra note 44, § 13.01(1) (footnotes omitted). See also id. §§ 13.05–13.07 
and 13.10–13.12 (discussing trust resources and uses). 
278 Id. § 13.01.1 (footnotes omitted). See also id. §§ 13.03, 13.04, and 13.08 (discussing 
the acquisition, nature, and inalienability of the state’s duties as trustee). 
279 Id. § 13.13 (2017). See also id. §§ 13.13(1)–(4) (discussing the role of the SWRCB 
and the Department of Fish and Game). 
280 Id. § 13.14(1)(a). 
BABIE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:15 PM 
2020] Federalism Fails Water 57  
allows for the SWRCB and the Department of Fish and Game to 
undertake this balancing process,281 with “neither domestic and 
municipal uses nor in-stream uses [able to] claim an absolute 
priority.”282 
In Australia, ecological flows are protected as either Commonwealth 
or state environmental water. This is achieved either through policy283 
or legislative instruments, such as the Water Act 2007 (Cth), “which 
sets a precedent for future management of other interstate shared water 
resources”284 and which requires a balance between the pursuit of 
economic objectives and the protection of the river environment, 
including a “return to environmentally sustainable levels of extraction 
for water resources that are overallocated or overused.”285 Unlike the 
United States, though, “[g]enerally, there are fewer legislative 
requirements for environmental water management at a state level.”286 
Nonetheless, every state employs some form of environmental water 
regime; most through rules-based environmental water, although 
Victoria, New South Wales, and Tasmania also provide for entitlement-
based environmental water.287 It is unclear, though, “how existing 
rules-based environmental water will be recognized and managed once 
state water plans expire” pursuant to “the Commonwealth’s framework 
for water planning and management set out in the [MDBP].”288 
South Australia, alone among all Australian States, takes a unique 
approach to ecological flows through the combined operation of the 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) (NRMA) and the River 
Murray Act 2003. The former seeks to manage all natural resources in 
an integrated and sustainable way, while the latter attempts such 
management, but its operation is limited to the portion of the River 
Murray that flows through South Australia.289 The NRMA requires that 
 
281 For these priority rules see id. § 13.14. 
282 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 729 n.30 (Cal. 1983). See also 
SLATER 2, supra note 44, § 13.14. 
283 Amy Hankinson, Environmental Water and Protection, in AUSTRALIAN WATER 
LAW, supra note 44, at 457–530, 479. 
284 Id. at 457–530, 480. On the operation of the Commonwealth environmental water 
regime, see id. at 480–82. 
285 Water Act 2007, supra note 199, s 3(d)(i). 
286 Hankinson, supra note 266, at 457–530, 479. 
287 See id. at 457–530, 483–503 (discussing the operation of state and territory 
environmental water regimes). 
288 Id. at 457–530, 479. 
289 See id. at 457–530, 495 (discussing the operation of the Commonwealth 
environmental water regime). See generally id. at 494–96. 
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water allocation plans which, with respect to environmental water, 
must 
• assess the quantity, quality, and timing of water needed by 
water-dependent ecosystems; 
• assess whether water extraction will have a detrimental effect 
on the quantity or quality of available water; 
• identify and assess methods for the management, 
conservation, and sustainable use of water; and 
• set out principles so that “the rate of taking and use of the 
water is sustainable.”290 
Within this framework, pursuant to the Natural Resources 
Management (General) Regulations 2005 (SA), promulgated under the 
NRMA, South Australia establishes an “environmental donations 
entitlement,” which is defined as 
a water licence or a water allocation— 
(a)  that relates to water in the River Murray . . . ; and 
(b)  that is subject to conditions to the effect— 
(i) that any water used under or in connection with the 
licence or water allocation may only be used for an 
environmental purpose in a manner accredited by the 
South Australian Murray Darling Basin Natural 
Resources Management Board; and 
(ii) that the person who is the holder of the licence or water 
allocation is accredited by the South Australian Murray 
Darling Basin Natural Resources Management Board to 
receive, transfer, or use donations of water for 
environmental purposes recognised by the board for the 
purposes of these regulations.291 
And the Regulations further provide that: 
(2)  The South Australian Murray Darling Basin Natural Resources 
Management Board must, in deciding whether to issue an 
accreditation for the purposes of a water licence or water 
allocation being recognised as an environmental donations 
entitlement, apply any criteria determined by the Minister. 292 
 
290 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), ch 4 pt 2 div 2 s 76. See Hankinson, 
supra note 266, at 457–530, 495. 
291 Natural Resources Management (General) Regulations 2005 (SA) pt 1 s 3(1). 
292 Id. at pt 1 s 3(2); see also Hankinson, supra note 266, at 457–530, 479 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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These entitlements may be held by “water authorities, state water 
departments, catchment bodies, . . . dedicated environmental 
managers,”293 and by a range of nongovernmental bodies.294 
While it appears as though South Australia provides significant 
protection for ecological flows, rather, the law there demonstrates the 
very Byzantine complexity in water resources law produced by the 
fragmentation of power effected by federalism, and the necessity to 
overcome its consequences through the equally imperfect means 
afforded by cooperative or flexible federalism. The real issue with 
ecological flows, in other words, concerns not whether they can be 
established—they can—but who manages the health of an interstate 
river as a whole when there are many states and the federal government 
involved. The protection of the riparian ecosystem becomes difficult 
without significant coordination, which cannot be found in cooperative 
federalism, no matter how extensive its use or how good the intentions 
of the governments engaging in it. True, the two levels of government 
need to act together. But they do not do that. Instead, what we find is 
that coordinating such efforts often proves an insurmountable 
challenge. The resolution of the recent CVP/SWP dispute between the 
United States and California demonstrates how difficult that can be: 
cooperation was neither swift nor cheap. Similar difficulties arise with 
respect to land use planning. 
2. Land Use Planning and Management 
In both the United States and Australia, neither federal government 
has the constitutional power to directly deal with land use planning and 
management that occurs entirely within a state.295 Instead, as with 
ecological flows, the regulation of land use planning and management, 
the creation of land use planning policy, and the control of development 
fall within state powers. In the United States, this is part of the police 
power of the states;296 in Australia, this power resides within the 
 
293 See Hankinson, supra note 266, at 457–530, 519. 
294 See id. at 457–530, 522 (discussing the operation of the Commonwealth 
environmental water regime). 
295 Of course, the federal government has power to deal with land use planning on 
federal land, but such land comprises a very small percentage of the total land area for which 
the nexus between water and land use management must be accounted. See KRISTINA 
ALEXANDER & ROSS W. GORTE, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY AND THE HISTORY OF ACQUISITION, DISPOSAL, AND RETENTION 2 (2007)  
(on federal control of such land in the United States). 
296 Norman Wengert, Constitutional Principles Applied to Land Use Planning and 
Regulation: A Tentative Restatement, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1979). 
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plenary power of the states with respect to natural resources.297 The 
federal governments, however, must rely upon those powers that allow 
them to act with respect to the environment generally.298 The Australian 
experience demonstrates the difficulties that can arise through this 
fragmentation of control. On the one hand, much of the decision-
making on the majority of development proposals within each state in 
the Murray-Darling Basin is made by local government authorities 
pursuant to powers contained in state government planning 
legislation.299 On the other hand, the Commonwealth has, through the 
judicious use of the financial power in section 96 of the Australian 
Constitution, made grants to the states for specified purposes, thereby 
ensuring that the implementation of policies on affordable housing, 
urban design and improvement, and infrastructure are able to take 
place.300 To demonstrate the difficulties that can arise as a consequence 
of this fragmentation of power over the interaction of water use and 
land use planning, here we consider what has happened in the Murray-
Darling system. 
The already scarce water of the Murray-Darling Basin is put to a 
wide range of uses, which requires regulation to separate out 
incompatible uses and to determine a sufficient provision of land for 
conservation purposes, residential development, retention of arable 
land, and myriad other land uses. Yet, as is no doubt obvious given our 
assessment of the allocation of power through federalism, no single 
government holds the sole power to make such determinations. 
Unsurprisingly, relinquishing control over land use and development 
approval is not something basin states are willing to do. Thus, in 
Australia, while a requirement for the basin states to ensure that any  
 
 
297 DANIEL CONNELL, WATER POLITICS IN THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN 176–77 
(2007). 
298 See OECD, LAND-USE PLANNING SYSTEMS IN THE OECD: COUNTRY FACT SHEETS: 
THE GOVERNANCE OF LAND USE COUNTRY FACT SHEET UNITED STATES (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/land-use-United-States.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7GT4-4GML] (for the position in the United States); Robert R. Wright, Constitutional 
Rights and Land Use Planning: The New and the Old Reality, 841 DUKE L.J. 841 (1977); 
see CONNELL, supra note 297 (for Australia). 
299 On similar arrangements in the United States, see Lyn Loyd Creswell, Federal 
Agency—Local Government Land Use Negotiations: Vulnerabilities of the Federal 
Bargaining Position, 33 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1988); OECD, LAND-USE 
PLANNING SYSTEMS IN THE OECD: COUNTRY FACT SHEETS: THE GOVERNANCE OF LAND 
USE COUNTRY FACT SHEET (2017), https://www.environment.gov.au/water/wetlands/ 
publications/coorong-and-lakes-alexandrina-and-albert-ramsar-wetland-factsheet 
[https://perma.cc/Q2XL-VBG6]. 
300 CONNELL, supra note, 297 at 176–77. 
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water management plans under state legislation that applies to the 
Murray-Darling Basin is consistent with the terms or requirements of 
the MDBA and the Water Act 2007 (Cth), no equivalent provision 
exists in state legislation concerning planning policy and development 
control decisions.301 This makes coordination difficult, if not 
impossible. South Australia provides a representative example of the 
difficulties of coordination. 
The long, winding journey of the River Murray ends in the South 
Australian town of Goolwa, discharging what waters remain in the river 
into the Southern Ocean. Obviously, both the volume and quality of 
water within the River Murray is affected by land uses within the 
upstream states.302 Moreover, as is the case of Los Angeles and the 
Colorado River, South Australia depends heavily upon the River 
Murray for the supply of water to the state capital, Adelaide, and further 
afield to a number of regional towns and cities. High extraction levels 
in the upstream states and drought conditions put significant pressure 
not only on the urban areas within South Australia but also on vital 
natural resources such as the Coorong and Lakes Alexandrina and 
Albert Ramsar Wetlands.303 It is therefore not surprising that of the 
basin states, South Australia has enacted the most comprehensive 
legislation in the basin for the purposes of attempting to manage and 
control land use: the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) and the Development 
Act 1993 (SA). In addition to those enactments, South Australian 
legislation defines and identifies River Murray protection areas 
consisting of the River Murray Floodplain Area and the River Murray 
Tributaries Area within the state.304 Within those areas, South 
Australian state planning and development controls require that 
particular regard be given to the impacts of land use proposals on the 
water resources of the River Murray. 
 
 
 
301 See, e.g., Natural Resources Management Act, s 87 (2004) (SA). 
302 See Diagram 2. 
303 The Coorong and Lakes Alexandrina and Albert wetland is one of Australia’s most 
important wetland areas. Australia designated the site, covering approximately 140,500 ha 
in South Australia, as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands in 1985. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, WATER, HERITAGE AND 
THE ARTS, COORONG AND LAKES ALEXANDRINA AND ALBERT RAMSAR WETLAND, FACT 
SHEET (2010), https://www.environment.gov.au/water/wetlands/publications/coorong-and-
lakes-alexandrina-and-albert-ramsar-wetland-factsheet [https://perma.cc/CAP8-VA7K] 
(parts of the Coorong also form the Coorong National Park and Game Reserve). 
304 River Murray Act 2003 s 4 (SA). The River Murray Protection Areas are defined in 
the River Murray Regulations Sched. 1 (2017) (SA). 
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The River Murray Act 2003 (SA) confers special protection on the 
River Murray within South Australia and establishes a coordinated 
system of water and land use management within the state, comprising 
six key components. First, the Murray itself is defined as the main stem 
of the River Murray and the natural resources of the river,305 with 
“natural resources” defined to include both cultural and natural 
heritage, and soil, minerals, and ecosystems associated with the Murray 
system.306 
Second, the Act establishes four Objectives for a Healthy River 
Murray (ORM) that apply to the operation of the legislation.307 The 
ORM focus on the protection, restoration, and enhancement of the 
River Murray, “in recognition of its critical importance to the South 
Australian community and its unique value from environmental, 
economic, and social perspectives.”308 The four ORMs are (1) river 
health objectives; (2) environmental flow objectives; (3) water quality 
objectives; and (4) human dimension objectives. The Minister, the 
Environment Resources and Development Court, and other persons or 
bodies involved in the administration of the legislation are each 
required to act consistently with and seek to further the ORMs.309 
Third, the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) places an emphasis on 
controlling and managing developments and activities to ensure that 
they “are undertaken in a way that provides the greatest benefit to, or 
protection of, the River Murray while at the same time providing for 
the economic, social and physical well-being of the community.”310 
The objects of the Act require mechanisms in place so that 
unacceptable development and activities likely to adversely affect the 
River Murray are prevented, regulated, or stopped.311 They require 
promoting principles of ecologically sustainable development,312 as 
defined in the Act,313 and giving “proper weight to the significance and 
well-being of the River Murray when legislative plans and strategies 
are being developed or implemented.”314 They also require recognition 
 
305 River Murray Act 2003 s 3 (SA). 
306 Id. 
307 Id. s 7(1)–(6). 
308 Id. s 6(1)(a). 
309 Id. s 8. 
310 Id. s 6(1)(b). 
311 Id. s 6(1)(c). 
312 Id. s 6(1)(d). 
313 Id. s 6(2). 
314 Id. s 6(1)(e). 
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of Indigenous rights and interests,315 and the rights generally of the 
broader community to a healthy Murray.316 
Fourth, the legislation provides for further coordination of the 
various South Australian legislative regimes, which play a role in the 
comprehensive management of land and water in the South Australian 
portion of the Murray system. It does this by defining a number of 
“related operational Acts,”317 including the Development Act 1993 
(SA), the Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA), the National Parks 
and Wildlife Act 1972 (SA), and the Natural Resources Management 
Act 2004 (SA). Thus, where proposals for policies or regulations arise 
pursuant to one of these related operational acts, or when an application 
for a statutory authorization under one of those acts requires referral to 
the Minister for consideration,318 the Minister must take into account 
and seek to further the ORMs and objectives of the River Murray Act 
2003 (SA).319 In addition to that coordination, in the case of a statutory 
instrument, the Minister must take into account the terms or 
requirements of the MDBA and any resolution of its Ministerial 
Council, as well as any relevant provision of the basin plan under the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth).320 
Fifth, when considering an application for a statutory authorization 
pursuant to the River Murray Act 2003 (SA), the Minister must take 
account of a range of defined factors, including the following: (1) the 
extent to which the proposed activity will affect the River Murray;321 
(2) the extent to which any similar activity is being undertaken, or is 
likely to be undertaken in the foreseeable future, in any other part of 
the Murray-Darling Basin;322 and (3) the accumulative effects or 
anticipated accumulative effects of the activity on the River Murray.323 
Finally, the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) also interacts with the state 
development control system pursuant to the Development Act 1993 
(SA). As such, various forms of proposed development in the River 
Murray Floodplain Area324 or the River Murray Tributaries Area325 
 
315 Id. s 6(1)(f). 
316 Id. s 6(1)(g). 
317 Id. s 5(2). 
318 Id. s 22(2). 
319 Id. s 22(4)(a). 
320 Id. s 22(4)(b). 
321 Id. s 22(4)(c)(i). 
322 Id. s 22(4)(c)(ii). 
323 Id. s 22(4)(c)(ii). 
324 Development Regulations 2008 (SA) sch 8 pt 2 para 19. 
325 Id. at sch 8, pt 2, para 20. 
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must be referred to the Minister who, for the time being, administers 
the River Murray Act 2003 (SA).326 The Minister has a broad general 
power to either direct the planning authority to refuse consent for the 
development proposal or, if the planning authority determines that 
development plan consent is appropriate, to direct the planning 
authority to attach particular conditions specified by the Minister for 
planning consent.327 Importantly, on such a referral from the planning 
authority, the Minister responsible for the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) 
is to bear in mind the responsibility to act consistently with and seek to 
further the ORMs.328 
The River Murray Act 2003 (SA), taken on its own, establishes 
important coordination in relation to water and land use planning and 
management in and around the River Murray to the extent that it flows 
within South Australia. It predated the Water Act 2007 (Cth), which 
establishes arrangements for protection of the whole Murray-Darling 
Basin and places restrictions on consumptive water use throughout the 
basin. And therein lies the problem. While South Australia has put in 
place specific laws that seek to control and manage land use planning 
and development in the River Murray protection areas within that state, 
each of those areas sits within the larger Murray-Darling Basin. As 
such, while the South Australian regime might provide for coordinated 
water and land management within the state, by virtue of section 109 
of the constitution, it cannot address that management at the basin-wide 
level—that regime being subordinate to the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and 
the MDBP. 
Thus, while many of the watercourses within upstream basin states 
feed into rivers and tributaries that flow into the Murray-Darling 
system, and while those riparian areas are heavily regulated under their 
own state land use planning and development laws, no coordination 
exists between the different state regulatory regimes, and the 
Commonwealth is unable to manage those regimes to the extent that 
they operate solely within a state. The only way that such coordination 
could be achieved is through more cooperative federalism; a transfer 
from each basin state and territory to the Commonwealth government 
of their planning and development control powers. History, of course, 
 
326 The River Murray Floodplain Area and the River Murray Tributaries Area are both 
River Murray Protection Areas for the purposes of the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) and any 
other legislation, such as the Development Act 1993 (SA). Both areas are delineated in the 
River Murray Regulations 2017 (SA) sch 1 and s 4. 
327 Development Regulations 2008 (SA) sch 8 pt 1 s 2(d)(iii). 
328 These objectives are outlined in the River Murray Act 2003 s 7 (SA). 
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suggests that this is unlikely. And even if it was likely, cooperative 
federalism itself is an imperfect solution to the problems created by 
federalism. 
None of this ought to surprise us. When control is fragmented 
between the federal and state governments, federalism simply cannot 
deal with the complex, integrated challenge posed by interstate 
watercourses. David Owen writes succinctly with respect to the 
Colorado River: 
Among the many difficulties of truly dealing with over-allocation, 
once the compact states, the Department of the Interior, and Congress 
have reached the point where doing so is unavoidable, is that no one 
can say authoritatively how much water truly exists to be divided, 
beyond the very short term: it’s not a fixed, unvarying amount.329 
The federal history of the Colorado and Murray-Darling Basins is 
itself the history of an attempt to find a way to deal with the tyrannical 
federal fragmentation of power.330 That is unlikely to change, no matter 
the degree of cooperative or flexible federalism that can be achieved. 
Deverell and Sitton suggest that the problem of allocation in the 
Colorado River—and balancing consumptive uses with ecological 
flows—demands “bigger actions, on a statewide or even a federal scale, 
with regulatory or enforcement teeth.”331 But when it comes to 
federalism and water, as with each of the challenges we identify in this 
part, the suggestion of bigger actions simply describes the problem; it 
hardly offers a solution. The same is true of Indigenous cultural flows, 
to which we now turn. 
B. First Nations Cultural Flows 
Water played a central role in the lives of First Nations or Indigenous 
peoples living in the Colorado and Murray-Darling Basins.332 Long 
before European settlement, Indigenous peoples inhabited the lands 
around the Murray River.333 So too, in the southwestern United States, 
where the Paiute people practiced irrigation in harmony with local 
conditions, “watch[ing] how nature waters the grasses and bulbs, then 
follow[ing] suit.”334 In the American southwest, the pueblo societies of 
 
329 OWEN, supra note 145, at 230. 
330 See generally GUEST, supra note 112; OWEN, supra note 145, at 232–33. 
331 DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146, at 141. 
332 See generally VIRGINIA MARSHALL, OVERTURNING AQUA NULLIUS: SECURING 
ABORIGINAL WATER RIGHTS (2017). 
333 GUEST, supra note 112, at 4. 
334 WORSTER, supra note 17, at 32. 
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what is now Mexico—the Zuni, the Hopi, the Papago, and the Sonoran 
peoples335—used various forms of irrigated agriculture to water their 
crops,336 “demonstrat[ing] an intimate knowledge of the desert 
ecosystem, stream hydraulics, and agronomy. But theirs was not a 
science devoted to the technical conquest of nature; rather, it aimed 
more modestly at achieving a secure coexistence and a thrifty 
subsistence.”337 And before the Papago and Pima Indians, the 
Hohokam Indians practiced ambitious, large-scale irrigated 
agriculture.338 
Chris Guest’s assessment of what happened with European 
settlement in Australia could be applied with equal force anywhere that 
Europeans sought new territory, including the United States: 
“European colonisation disrupted fundamentally this way of life,”339 
treating water as aqua nullius and thus susceptible to the acquisition of 
sovereignty by colonizing European nations.340 Yet, notwithstanding 
this disruption, First Nations peoples in the United States and Australia 
continue to practice aspects of their way of life prior to such contact.341 
This, of course, in some cases requires flows of water where that way 
of life depended upon riparian contact. In the United States, “[b]oth 
water and land were sacred to nearly all Indian cultures. This was a 
belief that had survived and even grown stronger since the development 
of the [U.S.] reservation system”;342 while in Australia “water holds 
cultural and spiritual significance for may Indigenous groups.”343 Thus, 
 
335 For a map of First Nations American Southwest, see American Indian Culture 
 of the Southwest, KHAN ACAD., https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/ 
precontact-and-early-colonial-era/before-contact/a/southwest-indian-culture [https://perma. 
cc/AM47-SYTD] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
336 WORSTER, supra note 17, at 32–36. 
337 Id. at 34. 
338 Id. 
339 GUEST, supra note 112, at 4. 
340 MARSHALL, supra note 332 (describing “terra nullius” as the doctrine of 
international law that treated colonial lands as lands belonging to no one; “aqua nullius” 
applies the same approach to water). 
341 See generally Peter Burdon et al., Decolonising Indigenous Water ‘Rights’ in 
Australia: Flow, Difference, and the Limits of Law, 5 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 334 
(2015); Lorena Allam, We Can Help Save the Murray-Darling, Indigenous Nations Say: 
Call for Government to Support First Nations to Acquire Water for Cultural Flows, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/03/we-
can-help-save-the-murray-darling-indigenous-nations-say?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other 
[https://perma.cc/ELB2-CXDV]. 
342 GOTTLIEB, supra note 3, at 221. 
343 Kate Stoeckel & Susanna Lawrence, Water Planning and Management, in 
AUSTRALIAN WATER LAW 34 (Kate Stoeckel et al. eds., 2012). 
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in Australia, the concept of “cultural flows” has emerged as a way of 
describing “water of a sufficient and adequate quantity and quality to 
improve the spiritual, cultural, environmental, social and economic 
conditions of those Indigenous nations”344 who traditionally reside 
throughout a river system.345 We adopt the same usage in this Article. 
Yet, as with every other dimension of the federal fragmentation of 
control over interstate water allocation, it is unclear which level of 
government has the power to deal with such flows.346 
As concerns Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the 
Australian Constitution began life in expressly racist terms;347 an 
amendment in 1967,348 however, removed some of the worst 
provisions, at the same time removing power from the states to legislate 
with respect to “the people of any race . . . for whom it is deemed 
necessary to make special laws.”349 This, in conjunction with section 
109 (the paramountcy clause) means that in the case of conflict between 
Commonwealth and state laws with respect to Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander peoples, the former prevails. Similarly, in the United 
States, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Commerce 
Clause (providing the federal government with the power to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes350); the treaty,351 war,352 foreign 
affairs,353 and property powers;354 and the plenary power doctrine355 as 
 
344 Allam, supra note 341. 
345 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 493–94; Burdon et al., supra 
note 341. 
346 See Allam, supra note 341. 
347 See Australian Constitution s 51(xvi), s 127. Section 51(xvi) provided that the 
Commonwealth had power to legislate with respect to “the people of any race, other than 
the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws,” 
while s 127 provided that “[i]n reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, 
or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted.” 
Id. 
348 Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 (Cth). See Sarah Pritchard, The ‘Race’ 
Power in Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution, 15 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 44 (2011). 
349 Pritchard, supra note 348, at 44 (quoting Australian Constitution s 51(xvi)). 
350 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
351 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
352 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16. 
353 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
354 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
355 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557–62 (1832). See also United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
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conferring upon Congress and the President almost unlimited power 
over Indian tribes.356 
But because the states retain their constitutional powers with respect 
to water law, it is unclear which level of government has the power to 
manage cultural flows, with attempts at cooperative or flexible 
federalism achieving limited success. It has long been known that the 
cooperative federalism that produced the 1922 Compact in the United 
States and the MDBP in Australia failed to understand the importance 
of cultural flows as central to the Indigenous relationship to land and 
water,357 and so largely ignored the significant interests of First Nations 
peoples.358 
In the Colorado Basin, it seemed in the early twentieth century that 
cultural flows might be given priority over other appropriative 
consumptive rights. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Winters v. United States359 purported to give priority to Indian water 
rights which “arise on, border, traverse, underlie, or are encompassed 
within Indian reservations,”360 and Article VII of the 1922 Compact—
the shortest of the eleven Articles—provides that “[n]othing in this 
compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the United 
States of America to Indian tribes.”361 Yet neither Winters nor Article 
VII gained any traction. In relation to the former, “[n]o one could say, 
would say, where or how far the Winters doctrine applied. And in that 
state of ambiguity the white appropriators had an uneasy but clear edge: 
they were already in possession.”362 Indeed, the 1963 decision of the 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California narrowed the Winters doctrine 
to apply only to that water required by Indians for “practicably irrigable 
acreage.”363 As to Article VII, the issue has become one of 
quantification of the Indian water entitlement; but, as Owen writes, 
 
356 Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 202 (1984); James A. Poore III, The Constitution of 
the United States Applies to Indian Tribes, 59 MONT. L. REV. 51, 55 (1998). 
357 Burdon et al., supra note 341, at 334. See also STATE OF THE ROCKIES PROJECT 
2011-12 RESEARCH TEAM, supra note 156. 
358 See WORSTER, supra note 17 at 297–99; OWEN, supra note 145, at 70–72 (2017); 
GOTTLIEB, supra note 3, at 219–23, 227–28; GUEST, supra note 112, at 190–91. 
359 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See also Huffaker et al., supra note 
66. 
360 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.03[2][a], at 1213 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed. 2012). 
361 Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West 2019). 
362 WORSTER, supra note 17, at 298 (footnote omitted). 
363 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). See also GOTTLIEB, supra note 3, 
at 219–20. 
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“not surprisingly, Indians have usually been more interested than non-
Indians in quantifying Indian water rights.”364 Thus, while the federal 
government might have the absolute power to legislate, the status of 
Indian water rights generally, and cultural flows specifically, remains 
tenuous at best. 
In the Murray-Darling Basin, the two major efforts at cooperative 
federalism prior to the MDBP—the River Murray Waters Agreement 
1915 and the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1992365—made almost 
no provision either for Indigenous water rights or for cultural flows.366 
And while disputes that arose over such water rights seemed to provide 
guidance as to how interstate management might provide for future 
recognition of such flows,367 unsurprisingly, little progress has been 
made with the implementation of a strategy for cultural flows within 
the NWI. Similarly, the Water Act 2007 (Cth) makes no explicit 
provision for these flows.368 Thus, unlike the United States, where 
power resides almost exclusively with the federal government, in 
Australia, paradoxically, given the seemingly strong power of the 
Commonwealth to legislate with respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, it is the states that have attempted to deal with cultural 
flows, albeit very imperfectly.369 The MDBP requires only that states 
consider cultural flows when making other allocation plans. And only 
a few states in fact recognize Indigenous water rights as part of their 
water resources law.370 New South Wales provides the widest 
amplitude of protection, with the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) 
providing for specific-purpose licenses through “macro water sharing 
plans,” which apply to a number of catchments or water sources.371 
Such licenses may be issued for either commercial or cultural purposes, 
the latter of which can include hunting, fishing, recreation, cultural 
activities, and ceremonial activities.372 
 
364 OWEN, supra note 145, at 72. See also GOTTLIEB, supra note 3, at 219–23, 227–28. 
On the Winters doctrine generally and quantification or measure of the right, see SLATER 2, 
supra note 44, § 15.12; MacDonnell et al., supra note 145, at 828. 
365 Given full legal effect by the Murray-Darling Basin Act 1993 (Cth). 
366 See GUEST, supra note 112, 190–91. 
367 Id. 
368 See also Allam, supra note 341. 
369 Diane Skapinker et al., Evolution of Water Rights, in AUSTRALIAN WATER LAW 11–
30, 29 (Kate Stoeckel et al. eds., 2012); Stoeckel & Lawrence, supra note 343, at 34. 
370 Skapinker et al., supra note 369, at 29; Allam, supra note 341. 
371 On how the system works, see NSW DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., OFF. WATER, 
MACRO WATER SHARING PLANS – THE APPROACH FOR GROUNDWATER (2015). 
372 Skapinker et al., supra note 369, at 29–30 (footnotes omitted); Stoeckel & Lawrence, 
supra note 343, at 34. 
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The rights (either water rights or cultural flow rights) protected in 
Australian state law—and generally speaking, in American law too—
if they can so be described, are weak. Cultural flows have been 
historically overlooked, and today are treated as a secondary aim to 
economic priorities.373 The South Australian Royal Commission 
Report put this in stark terms: “[T]he ‘elephant in the room’ for all 
Basin States — where will water for cultural flows come from, in a 
largely overallocated system?”374 The Royal Commission concluded 
that there must be “[a] stronger legal platform for the role of Aboriginal 
people in managing Basin water resources.”375 The very fact that it is 
the states who have acted in Australia, and in a piecemeal fashion at 
that, simply serves to highlight the problem—state action is fragmented 
action. And in the absence of state power to legislate, as in the United 
States, short of federal action the result is the same: limited, if any, 
protection for cultural flows. As such, neither one level of government 
nor both levels of government acting cooperatively can deal with the 
totality of cultural flows across the whole of the integrated systems 
found in the Colorado and Murray-Darling Basins. 
C. International Obligations 
One might, at first blush, assume that the management of water 
resources within one nation raises no international dimensions. Closer 
examination, however, shows that assumption to be false. The 
management of water by a single nation, notwithstanding the internal 
organization of that state, often involves international obligations376 
that may arise in one or both of two ways. The United States illustrates 
the first and most obvious instance: geography. Unregulated, the 
Colorado River once reached the sea not in any part of the United 
States, but in Mexico (see Diagram 1).377 Thus, the mere fact that use 
by the upstream users of the Colorado River in the United States affects  
 
 
373 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 196, at 497. 
374 Id. at 499. 
375 Id. 
376 See, e.g., Joseph Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta, Toward Global Water Law, 14 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 437 (2008) (describing international water obligations); Salman 
M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: 
Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 WATER RES. DEV. 625 (2007) (describing 
international water obligations); Jamie Benidickson, The Evolution of Canadian Water Law 
and Policy: Securing Safe and Sustainable Abundance, 13 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y 59 (2017) (describing international water obligations); Parched, supra 
note 146. 
377 See DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146. 
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the downstream user, Mexico, forces international considerations upon 
both the federal and state governments.378 Australia demonstrates the 
second way in which international considerations arise with respect to 
water resources entirely within one nation: 
Australia is an island state with permanent sovereignty over its 
natural resources, including water. [D]espite this physical isolation, 
Australia is signatory to a number of international treaties and 
conventions that affect the domestic management of . . . water 
resources. In addition, Australia has subscribed to a range of 
international policy instruments which, although not legally binding, 
contain desirable objectives, targets and programs relevant to the 
management of Australia’s resources.379 
In other words, either geography, voluntarily entered international 
agreements or policy instruments, or the two together can establish 
international obligations.380 
In Australia, these obligations include the Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance (the Ramsar Convention),381 the 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (the World Heritage Convention),382 the World Charter for 
Nature,383 Agenda 21,384 and those rules of customary international law 
relating to freshwater resources summarized in the Berlin Rules on 
Water Resources.385 In the case of the Colorado River, while the 1922 
Compact failed to address a Mexican allocation, it did provide for the 
possibility of a future allocation “[i]f, as a matter of international 
comity, the United States . . . shall hereafter recognize in the United 
States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the Colorado 
River System.”386 Mexico’s entitlement was not expressly addressed 
until the conclusion of the 1944 Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of 
 
378 See Boepple, supra note 250, at 27. 
379 Stoeckel, supra note 126, at 1–10, 3–4. 
380 On these treaties, conventions and principles generally see id. at 1–10, 4–5; 
Hankinson, supra note 266, at 457–530, 467–479. 
381 Convention of Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245. 
382 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 
1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. 
383 G.A. Res. 35/7, Draft World Charter for Nature (Oct. 30, 1980). 
384 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development; Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development; Statement of Forest Principles: The Final Text of 
Agreements Negotiated by Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), 3–14 June 1992, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil (1993). 
385 International Law Association, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004). 
386 1922 Compact, Article III(c). 
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the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 
Treaty).387 
But how, given the fragmenting nature of power under the federal 
structures of Australia and the United States, can these obligations be 
given full effect? The short answer is that full effect cannot be given to 
these obligations. We have outlined the respective constitutional 
powers of the federal and state governments in both jurisdictions; the 
difficulty arises when the specific obligations must be implemented, as 
a matter of law, in each nation. The constitutional powers of the states 
to establish water resources law means that it becomes necessary for 
the involvement of both the federal and state governments to meet the 
obligations undertaken by the federal government. That typically 
proves difficult, if not impossible. 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government relied upon its 
constitutional powers with respect to external affairs and its consequent 
obligations under the Ramsar and World Heritage Conventions to enact 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) (EPBC Act) and to establish the NWI, which led to the enactment 
of the Water Act 2007 (Cth).388 The states, however, hold the power to 
deal with natural resources. As such, most international obligations 
must be managed by state governments and private landholders.389 This 
is hardly the optimal position with an integrated resource; indeed, the 
EPBC Act requires the Federal Environment Minister to develop a 
management plan for each Ramsar-listed wetland390 and at best “it has 
endeavoured to develop [these plans] in agreement with the relevant 
state.”391 
The United States is no different: while the 1944 Treaty supposedly 
settled Mexico’s allocation of Colorado River water, a formal protest 
was lodged by the government of Mexico. Mexico protested that it had 
been guaranteed “1.5 million acre-feet of water a year . . . of good 
quality, suitable for irrigation” but the states party to the 1922 Compact 
 
387 Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 
Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico, Mex.-U.S. Feb. 3-Nov. 14, 1944 
59 Stat. 1219. See also Anabel Sánchez, 1944 Water Treaty Between Mexico and the United 
States: Present Situation and Future Potential, 18 FRONTERA NORTE 125 (2006); 
GOTTLIEB, supra note 3, at 223–26. 
388 GUEST, supra note 112, at 206. 
389 EPBC Act, ss 326, 328. 
390 Id. 
391 Hankinson, supra note 266, at 457, 469. 
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took the view that it was the federal government’s responsibility to deal 
with the problem.392 
As we have already seen, when power is fragmented among the 
states and the federal government, with internal decisions made by 
both, it becomes unclear which level can take action, with imperfect 
cooperative or flexible federalism as the only solution. That, of course, 
is no solution at all—and in the absence of a workable solution in the 
face of voluntarily assumed obligations, or those imposed by 
geography, what hope can there be in the face of the greatest 
international challenge of all: climate change? 
D. Climate Change 
Climate change is the international challenge facing water resources 
ne plus ultra. For that reason, while an assessment of ecological flows 
might encompass a consideration of anthropogenic climate change, we 
give it separate treatment. This is because its consequences for water 
resources have taken on their own importance, apart from treatment 
only as a matter of environmental protection. 
In general terms, climate change is a “threat multiplier”393 and “a 
giant magnifying glass, making all our challenges more extreme”394: 
“[t]he relationship between climate-related risks and conflict is 
complex and often intersects with political, social, economic and 
demographic factors.”395 Climate change carries the potential, 
simultaneously, to raise sea levels, cause crop failure, exacerbate water 
scarcity, and force mass migration of people from rural to urban 
regions. The effects of climate change, in turn, result in political 
instability, terrorism, civil unrest, and war, both intra- and interstate.396 
Indeed, while writing this Article, climate change produced extreme  
 
 
392 WORSTER, supra note 17, at 321. 
393 Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security Council Debates Its 
Impact on Peace, UN NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 
[https://perma.cc/SQH3-MJHU]. 
394 Thirsty Planet, ECONOMIST 5, 6 (Mar. 2, 2019) (special report about water). 
395 Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security Council Debates Its 
Impact on Peace, supra note 393 (quoting Rosemary DiCarlo, U.N. Under-Secretary-
General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs). 
396 Sarah Kennedy, Why Climate Change Is a ‘Threat Multiplier,’ YALE CLIMATE 
CONNECTIONS (Jun. 20, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/06/why-
climate-change-is-a-threat-multiplier/ [https://perma.cc/3K6U-Q77P]. 
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weather and widespread flooding in the midwestern United States.397 
The world is becoming increasingly attuned to the possibility that 
major international conflicts may have their origins, at least partly, in 
climate change,398 and it may become a central issue in the U.S. 2020 
Democratic presidential primaries,399 if not the general election 
itself.400 In short, climate change “is worse, much worse, than you 
think.”401 
The consequences of climate change are acute in the case of water: 
“climate change is water change,”402 or put more harrowingly, “[i]f 
climate change is a shark, the water resources are the teeth.”403 Climate 
change affects the supply of freshwater in two significant ways. First, 
wet places will become wetter and dry places dryer, exacerbating the 
inequality that already exists between those nine countries that hold 
sixty percent of all freshwater supplies and the rest of the world.404 And, 
second, as we are now seeing in the U.S. Midwest, extreme weather is 
becoming more frequent, affecting more people.405 Thus, rather than a 
steady supply, water will come in major rainfalls causing widespread 
flooding making the water and land unavailable for use, interspersed 
with long dry periods during which times water will be increasingly 
scarce.406 
For California, the ability to draw water from the SWP for urban 
uses in the south, especially in Los Angeles, will be diminished by  
 
 
397 Floods and Storms Are Altering American Attitudes to Climate Change, ECONOMIST 
(May 30, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/05/30/floods-and-storms-
are-altering-american-attitudes-to-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7A6H-X9M3]. 
398 How Climate Change Can Fuel Wars, ECONOMIST (May 23, 2019), https://www. 
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climate change, making the Colorado River supply that much more 
important. And because of the 1922 Compact and its interpretation in 
Arizona v. California, the reduced flows caused by climate change will 
mean that while California will continue to draw its full allotment, 
greater stress will be placed on Arizona and Nevada, which will not be 
able to draw their full allotments.407 Worse, how can the 1922 Compact 
itself even deal with the issue of diminution in flow to lower basin 
states caused by climate change?408 Article III(d) of the Compact 
provides that 
[t]he States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river 
at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-
feet for any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing 
progressive series beginning with the first day of October next 
succeeding the ratification of this compact. 
But what if it is climate change that causes the depletion? While the 
answer to that question simply is not known,409 we might venture a 
guess based upon our assessment of federalism and our examination of 
overallocation and overuse: no one level of government, or one 
government among several of a particular level (i.e., the states), has the 
power to determine what water can be divided among the party states 
to the 1922 Compact. The inability of one level of government to divide 
water resources intensifies even the 
“normal” fluctuations . . . exacerbated by climate change, whose 
most alarming likely effects include declining precipitation in the 
mountains that feed the river. Current estimates of climate-related 
reductions in the Colorado’s annual flow, by mid-century, range from 
about ten percent to about thirty percent. If those estimates turn out 
to be accurate, existing allocations will be even less meaningful than 
they are now. And, if the current drought lasts even half as long as 
any of the extended dry periods of the past, none of the current 
numbers will mean anything.410 
Some suggest that the United States Supreme Court could resolve 
the ambiguity in the Compact. But the problem is one of the incidence 
of power; if the Court takes up the task, it is wresting it from the hands 
of the water managers. The problem has been put with force: “Are we 
going to let guys and gals in black robes start making these decisions 
for us, or are we going to come together and maybe not have a perfect 
solution from everybody’s perspective, but a solution that works for 
 
407 DEVERELL & SITTON, supra note 146, at 140–44. 
408 See generally supra Diagram 1. 
409 OWEN, supra note 145, at 22–23. 
410 Id. at 230–31. 
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everybody?”411 And even if the “guys and gals in black robes” did step 
in to provide an imperfect solution, given the ten orders to date in 
Arizona v. California is it likely doing so would provide a lasting and 
comprehensive approach? Moreover, given the limited nature of such 
litigation, that would be just one of Sutton’s fifty-one imperfect 
solutions. In both the Colorado and Murray-Darling Basins, there is 
“mounting evidence of climate change, and with it the prospect of an 
even more variable pattern of water inflows, higher temperatures and 
longer droughts.”412 Establishing some sort of solution is akin to 
“pushing a great big rock up a very steep hill to get the states to really 
get behind their work.”413 
Cooperative federalism seems an unlikely prospect in the face of the 
challenge of climate change for water supply and allocation. Thus, the 
tyrannical mix of federalism, water, and climate change works its 
perverse magic on the lives and livelihoods of so many in the Colorado 
and Murray-Darling Basins. Whatever the solutions to climate change 
may be, they will be made that much more difficult for the decision-
making authority implementing them under the fragmented system of 
federalism. How, in a federal system, can the invidious role played by 
climate change with respect to managing the water resource be dealt 
with? In short, it cannot. We have already seen two such ongoing 
disputes which concern water—that between the United States federal 
government and California over the Coordinated Operation Agreement 
in the Central Valley Project/State Water Project and that between the 
Australian Commonwealth government and the Murray-Darling basin 
states over the NWI and the Water Act 2007 (Cth). Similar examples 
can be found in relation to climate change. And these federalism 
disputes over climate change can themselves lead to litigation 
producing new imperfect solutions; indeed, litigation provides no 
greater certainty as to which level of government can deal with the 
challenges of climate change.414 
A recent Canadian case illustrates the problems inherent in 
federalism litigation involving climate change. In re Greenhouse Gas 
 
411 Stan. Univ. Rural W. Initiative, supra note 42 (quoting John Entsminger). 
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Pollution Pricing Act415 was decided by the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, and for which the Saskatchewan Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General have filed notice of leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.416 The case starkly demonstrates the difficulty that 
any federal system has in dealing with the interface of managing water 
resources while also addressing the challenge of climate change. As in 
the U.S. and Australian Constitutions, no express provision of the 
Canadian Constitution deals with the environment generally, let alone 
climate change specifically.417 Thus, in In re Greenhouse Gas Pollution 
Pricing Act, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was asked to determine 
whether the government of Canada had the sole power to deal with 
Canada’s response to climate change through the enactment of the 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act. This Act would ensure a 
minimum national price on greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) to 
encourage their mitigation.418 The government of Canada relied on 
seven heads of exclusive constitutional power to enact this legislation: 
the power to tax; the general trade and commerce power; the treaty 
power; the criminal law power; the emergency power; and the residual 
“[p]eace, [o]rder, and good [g]overnment” (POGG) power; and, 
possibly, the power to act in furtherance of respecting the existing 
treaty rights of Canada’s First Nations peoples.419 The court did not 
consider the possible provincial (the Canadian equivalent of state) 
powers which might be employed to deal with climate change. 
A sharply divided Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the Act 
was within the constitutional authority of the Canadian government 
pursuant to the POGG power.420 Yet the majority wrote: 
[The] fundamental reality is perhaps somewhat obscured in areas like 
the regulation of GHG emissions where the constitutional boundaries 
between federal and provincial [the Canadian equivalent of U.S. and  
 
 
415 In re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 (Sask. R.). See also 
Reference re Environmental Management Act (British Columbia), 2019 BCCA 181; 
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544; Reference re 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74. 
416 Notice of Appeal dated May 31, 2019; Notice of Constitutional Question dated May 
31, 2019 (on file with the authors). 
417 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, 
no 5 (Can.); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.); 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
418 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.). 
419 See Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 53, 91, 91(2)–(3), 91(27), 132; Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, § 35. 
420 See Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40, para. 210. 
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Australian states] authority might be somewhat unclear and where 
there is at least room for both levels of government to legislate. 
Nonetheless, the basic point remains the same. The scope of 
Parliament’s constitutional authority is not dependent on how or 
whether a province has exercised its own exclusive jurisdiction. 
Conversely, and putting the doctrine of paramountcy to the side, the 
scope of the province’s constitutional authority is not dependent on 
how Parliament has or has not exercised its jurisdiction.421 
The minority, who held that the Act could not be supported as an 
exercise of federal power, nonetheless agreed with the majority 
concerning the nature of federalism and the division of powers as it 
relates to climate change.422 The minority wrote: 
[W]e would reiterate two points. First, we agree that all levels of 
government in Canada must take action to address climate change. 
The anthropogenic emission of GHGs is an issue of pressing  
concern to all Canadians and to the world. Second, Parliament  
has a number of constitutional powers, legislative means, and 
administrative mechanisms at its disposal to achieve its objectives in 
this regard. This [case] arises because Parliament chose not to avail 
itself of its established constitutional powers or to do so validly. 
Notwithstanding the existential threat of climate change, federalism 
in Canada means that all governments of Canada must bring all law-
making power to bear on the issue of climate change, but in a way 
that respects the division of powers under the Constitution . . . .423 
Put another way, both levels of government in Canada have the 
power to deal with some components of the climate change challenge 
and the mitigation of GHG. The situation is no different in either the 
United States or Australia. As with ecological flows, there is a 
fragmentation of the constitutional power to deal with climate change. 
Neither level of government has been given the sole power over the 
environment nor climate change, with both holding fragments of that 
power. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court considered responsibility 
for climate change in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency,424 while in Australia, the High Court has yet to consider the 
issue, although it has dealt with the environment more generally in 
Commonwealth v Tasmania.425 In the former, without explicitly  
 
 
421 Id. at para. 67 (Richards, C.J., Jackson, J., and Schwann, J.). 
422 Id. at para. 476–77 (Ottenbreit, J., and Caldwell, J.). 
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424 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); but see Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
425 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
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considering the constitutional power of the Congress to enact such 
legislation, the Supreme Court determined that the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency could use the Clean Air Act426 to 
enforce pollution controls over GHGs.427 In the latter, the High Court 
found that the Commonwealth had power to act in relation to 
environmental protection pursuant to powers we have already seen with 
respect to water—those regarding external affairs, corporations, and 
the just terms acquisition of property.428 And while it is true that both 
California429 and South Australia430 have enacted legislation to deal 
with climate change (as, indeed, have many states in both countries),431 
the precise constitutional power upon which they rely in doing so is 
unclear. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the High Court 
of Australia has explicitly addressed the power the states might have 
with respect to the environment or climate change.432 Thus, as the 
majority in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal concluded, both the 
United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia leave 
uncertain the issue of which level of government has which precise 
power to legislate for the environment and climate change. Like water, 
the constitution fragments the power of management, all of which is a 
problem: 
The world’s gathering environmental problems are deeply 
interrelated, and they can’t be addressed effectively if they’re 
addressed in isolation: water here, energy there, transportation 
somewhere else. But this sort of big-picture environmentalism is hard 
to define, much less to pull off, since even people who worry about 
the future of civilization tend to specialize.433 
 
426 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-91). 
427 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
428 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
429 California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program: Emissions of Greenhouse 
Gases Act, 2018 Cal. Stat. 312. 
430 Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act (2007) (SA). 
431 See Can American States Slow Global Warming on Their Own?, ECONOMIST (June 
29, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/06/29/can-american-states-slow-
global-warming-on-their-own [https://perma.cc/68B8-7MGA]; America Is Not Such a 
Laggard on Climate Change as It Seems, ECONOMIST (June 29, 2019), https://www. 
economist.com/leaders/2019/06/29/america-is-not-such-a-laggard-on-climate-change-as-
it-seems [https://perma.cc/4N3P-FGJN]. 
432 Although, this may ultimately come to the United States Supreme Court as part of 
Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 
2016); Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir.). See Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky, 
& Anita Foerster, Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of Climate Change Litigation in Australia, 
41 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 793 (2000). 
433 OWEN, supra note 145, at 257–58. 
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Proponents of the existing constitutional federal settlements might 
suggest that the solution is more cooperative or flexible federalism.434 
But combine the constitutional jurisdictional uncertainty with respect 
to the environment and climate change and what we have already  
seen with respect to the power to manage water resources, and what 
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act really 
demonstrates is the impotence of federalism in dealing with the 
complex challenges already found in the Colorado and Murray-Darling 
Basins. Further, climate change amplifies and magnifies these 
challenges. No one government can deal with either climate change or 
the river as a whole—what hope is there for any government to deal 
with both in an integrated way? Simply, there is little to no hope. 
Cooperative or flexible federalism is already revealing strains and 
fractures as it struggles to keep pace with ever-increasing demands on 
water, let alone what climate change is already doing, and will do, to 
those demands. 
COMPARATIVE THEMES AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
Three overarching themes emerge from our assessment of 
federalism when applied to the allocation of constitutional power over 
the control of water resources: fragmentation, Byzantine complexity, 
and, ultimately, tyranny. The fragmentation of power to control water 
resources between a national (federal) government, and states—as 
demonstrated by an examination of California and South Australia—
produces, out of necessity, cooperative or flexible federalism. And 
from that intergovernmental “cooperation” emerges another layer of 
law—which we considered in our earlier companion article to this 
one435—dealing with the way in which governments allocate private 
power over water through property. That law, the water resources law 
of the various states in the United States and Australia—again 
represented here by California and South Australia—when combined 
with the constitutional allocation of power to create water law, 
produces a body of law characterized by Byzantine complexity, 
working a tyranny of ineffectual management on the water resource. 
But what does it matter that we reveal this labyrinthine Byzantinism 
in American and Australian water law? One might legitimately ask 
whether this entire Article is nothing but an elaborate—complex!—
 
434 See, e.g., Adam Webster, supra note 42; Stewardson, supra note 42; Kingsford, supra 
note 42; Stan. Univ. Rural W. Initiative, supra note 42. 
435 Babie, Leadbeter & Nikias, supra note 29. 
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thought experiment on the merits of federalism. Federalism appears 
here to stay. At the very least, the nature of the intergovernmental 
relationships that exist between the federal and state governments in 
both the United States and in Australia (and the seemingly endless hope 
that a political solution might be achieved through a never-ending 
schedule of meetings in an attempt to foster greater cooperation, or 
flexibility) strongly suggests that federalism is not going anywhere 
soon. That may be true, but we nonetheless believe that there is value 
in this exercise for three reasons. 
First, and above all, by better understanding the problems federalism 
creates through its fragmenting tyranny, we are better placed to address 
them within the current federal structure in the United States and 
Australia. There are good reasons for wanting to attempt solutions, 
most prominent among them that rivers are, just possibly, people too! 
As innovative solutions in New Zealand and India demonstrate,436 if 
the federal democracies in the United States and Australia were to treat 
the major interstate watercourses, such as the Colorado and the Murray-
Darling, as legal persons, this would go a long way toward treating 
 
436 See Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (N.Z.); Salim v. 
State of Uttarakhand & others, WPPIL 126/2014, High Court of Uttarakhand ¶ 19 (Mar. 20, 
2017); Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand & others, WPPIL 140/2015, High Court of 
Uttarakhand ¶ 64 (2017); Erin L O’Donnell, At the Intersection of the Sacred and the Legal: 
Rights for Nature in Uttarakhand, India, 30 J. ENVTL. L. 135 (2018); Abigail Hutchison, 
The Whanganui River as a Legal Person, 39 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 179 (2014); Erin L. 
O’Donnell and Julia Talbot-Jones, Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons from 
Australia, New Zealand, and India, 23 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 7 (2018). On environmental 
personhood, see Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 49 (2018). Proposals for legal personhood have also been made in relation to the Colorado 
River in the United States and the Murray-Darling system in Australia. See Laura Spitz and 
Eduardo Moises Peñalver, Nature’s Personhood and Property’s Virtues, U. NEW MEXICO 
SCH. L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER 2020-1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3538522 [https://perma.cc/8GX2-FEUD]; Michelle Etheridge, Murray River Nature 
Rights Proposed as Legal Protection for Watercourse, ADVERTISER (Dec. 21, 2019,  
1:42 PM), https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/search-results?q=Murray+River+Nature+ 
Rights+Proposed+as+Legal+Protection+for+Watercourse [https://perma.cc/H3FZ-XGU6]. 
In 2019, the Bangladesh Supreme Court declared all of its rivers to be legal persons. Rina 
Chandran, Fears of Evictions as Bangladesh Gives Rivers Legal Rights, REUTERS  
(July 4, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-landrights- 
rivers/fears-of-evictions-as-bangladesh-gives-rivers-legal-rights-idUSKCN1TZ1ZR 
[https://perma.cc/4UST-FRVC]; Ashley Westerman, Should Rivers Have Same Legal 
Rights as Humans? A Growing Number of Voices Say Yes, NPR (Aug. 3, 2019,  
8:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/03/740604142/should-rivers-have-same-legal-
rights-as-humans-a-growing-number-of-voices-say-ye [https://perma.cc/AEN7-2SK4];  
see also Gabriel Eckstein et al., Conferring Legal Personality on the World’s Rivers:  
A Brief Intellectual Assessment, WATER INT’L, TEX. A&M UNIV. SCH. L. LEGAL  
STUD. RES. PAPER, no. 19-30, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3431344 [https://perma.cc/EAE3-8TUB]. 
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those rivers as they ought to be treated: as an integrated whole, 
incapable of fragmentation physically among multiple conflicting 
governments and multiple conflicting users. Put another way, treating 
interstate rivers as legal persons would, we hope, force those charged 
with management, both with public and private power, to attempt 
solutions that transcend the jurisdictional fragmentation wrought by 
federalism. 
Second, the reality of federalism ought to remind us of the important 
fact that we live in an empirical world. Herbert Blumer, one of the 
founders of phenomenological empirical social research, wrote: 
The aim of theory in empirical science is to develop analytical 
schemes of the empirical world with which the given science is 
concerned. This is done by conceiving the world abstractly, that is, 
in terms of classes of objects and of relations between such classes. 
Theoretical schemes are essentially proposals as to the nature of such 
classes and of their relations where this nature is problematic or 
unknown. Such proposals become guides to investigation to see 
whether they or their implications are true. Thus, theory exercises 
compelling influence on research—setting problems, staking out 
objects and leading inquiry into asserted relations. In turn, findings 
of fact test theories, and in suggesting new problems invite the 
formulation of new proposals. Theory, inquiry and empirical fact are 
interwoven in a texture of operation with theory guiding inquiry, 
inquiry seeking and isolating facts, and facts affecting theory. The 
fruitfulness of their interplay is the means by which an empirical 
science develops.437 
As with our companion article on the nature of property in water 
resources,438 we believe that our assessment of federalism here, far 
from causing us to throw up our hands and surrender in the face of 
fragmentation and tyranny, ought to provoke us to seek greater 
understanding of the way in which it operates in the lives of those 
people affected by its operation: consumptive water users themselves. 
And, in the case of federalism, such understanding need not be limited 
to those who hold private power—property—in water, nor to those who 
wield the public power that allows the creation of private power in the 
first place. It ought to be extended to other stakeholders, too: most 
importantly, for the concerns of Indigenous or First Nations peoples 
and for the interests of those in other nations affected by the allocation 
of public and private power in the United States or Australia. It ought 
to include, too, consideration of the place of the environment and the 
 
437 HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 140–
41 (1969). 
438 Babie, Leadbeter & Nikias, supra note 29. 
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impact of climate change in the lives of all interested parties and 
stakeholders. In other words, empirical research ought to search for 
answers to the operation of federalism and for solutions to the problems 
wrought by it by looking at the experiences of the holders of both 
private and public power over water, as well as of those stakeholders 
who seem otherwise to fall outside those two allocations of power. 
Only then can we ascertain whether federalism effects the optimal 
outcome in its distribution of governmental power over the water 
resource. Only then can we propose solutions that might actually 
produce positive outcomes for water users and stakeholders, including 
Indigenous and First Nations peoples, the environment, and those 
peoples of other nations. 
This takes us to our third, and final, reflection as to why our 
assessment of federalism matters: the international dimension. Our 
review of federalism ought to force us to think of the ways in which the 
activities of governments and peoples within the United States and 
Australia might affect the peoples of other nations, such as Mexico in 
the case of the United States. In general terms, we think that the 
problems we reveal in this Article might allow us to identify further 
problems in other constitutional federal democracies that lawmakers 
might consider when reforming their own water resources law. Even 
more generally, the problems we have discussed in the theory and 
practice of federalism extend beyond the regulation of water. What we 
reveal in this Article about the United States and Australia may help to 
clarify a possible underlying reason for frictions in the politics of 
federal structures around the world. Though it may appear unrelated, it 
is possible to reflect on the current “Brexit” crisis in the European 
Union. Brexit may be conceived as a popular movement to take the 
United Kingdom out of a quasi-federal structure (the European Union) 
due to a deep distrust of the way in which that structure allocates 
governmental power. The problem we identify in water management in 
this Article may be extrapolated here. The point is this: by fragmenting 
issues and their management, we make their solution much more 
difficult; by further fragmenting, we only further divide problems (e.g., 
water allocation and the environment) that can only really be dealt with 
as an integrated whole. If Brexit represents the disintegration of quasi-
federal governmental and economic structures,439 it then demonstrates 
forcefully the difficulty that follows for the ability to deal with 
 
439 On the constitutionalized quasi-federal economic structures put in place by the 
European Union, see Paul O’Connell, The Constitutional Architecture of Injustice, in ON 
BREXIT: LAW, JUSTICES AND INJUSTICES 55 (Tawhida Ahmed & Elaine Fahey eds., 2019). 
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integrated policy challenges, which cannot be confined to political 
boundaries (e.g., water, or more generally, climate change).440 
We think this latter point is deeply significant. If it is impossible for 
competing units of government intrastate, within one nation, to be able 
to work together in order to solve the problems of water allocation and 
use, what hope is there for that to happen internationally, among 
different states? This challenge, in many ways, draws together all the 
others because it is really the issue of conflict caused by climate change 
in places like Darfur, Guatemala, Syria, and Sudan.441 It is the lack of 
equitable allocation of an already overallocated resource in the 
Colorado River. It is the failure to provide for First Nations and 
Indigenous cultural flows, where those interests cross international 
boundaries, and it is the failure to provide for ecological flows in the 
cross-boundary context. Each of these challenges are linked, 
inexorably, by climate change, which exacerbates and magnifies every 
other challenge. Indeed, once climate change exacerbates the scarcity 
of an already overallocated and overused resource at the national and 
then the international level, the threat of conflict over water, both 
within and between nations, looms ever larger.442 
But, it may not be war between nations. As one of the epigraphs with 
which we opened this Article suggests: unless we use water more 
sustainably and manage it more inclusively, we may indeed see more 
water-related conflict within countries than between them.443 What 
these conflicts might look like remains to be seen, but events in Syria 
and Sudan, with conflict over scarce water resources, itself the likely 
outcome of scarcity caused by climate change, ought to give us pause 
for concern.444 And for that reason, we hope this Article issues an 
urgent call for a consideration not only of the role played by federalism 
in producing the conditions within which such conflict can occur but 
 
440 See Jacob Aron, Climate Change and Swing Seats, 242 NEW SCIENTIST 5 (2019); 
Debora MacKenzie, Partition Mentality, 242 NEW SCIENTIST 23 (2019); An Equal and 
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441 See How Climate Change Can Fuel Wars, supra note 398. 
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also for a robust debate about the ways in which we might seek reform 
of the ways we allocate power, both public and private, over water. 
It is of course true that the states, in both the United States and 
Australia, are doing something to address issues that transcend state 
and even national boundaries, such as climate change, and because they 
are, perhaps the outlook is not as gloomy as we might otherwise portray 
it.445 Indeed, it may be that Sutton’s fifty-one imperfect solutions, far 
from states’ rights dressed up in a new clothes, is in fact the best way 
forward for federalism when it seeks to address the environment. Still, 
the fact remains, federalism fragments power and makes necessary 
fifty-one imperfect solutions; the mere fact of cooperation, or 
flexibility, does not make it optimal. It is imperfect, indeed, tyrannical, 
when it comes to water. In choosing between Sutton’s imperfect 
solutions and Bork’s tyranny as the best descriptors of federalism in the 
management of water resources, we think Bork got it right: federalism 
is tyranny. But, that doesn’t mean we need to reject outright Sutton’s 
“solutions” to the problem. Indeed, Sutton’s imperfection, if we must 
remain wedded to federalism, may be the only way forward. 
 
  
 
445 See Can American States Slow Global Warming on Their Own?, supra note 431; 
America Is Not Such a Laggard on Climate Change as It Seems, supra note 431. 
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